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PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.

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CORRESPONDENCE

RELATIVE TO THE

AFFAIRS OF THE LEVANT.

PART IV.

6

Foreign Office, July, 1841.

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.

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CORRESPONDENCE

RELATIVE TO

THE AFFAIRS OF THE LEVANT.

PART IV.

No. 1.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 25.)

(No. 75.)

My Lord,

Vienna, April 17, 1841.

I HAVE communicated to Prince Metternich the substance of Lord Ponsonby's despatches Nos. 123 and 124, to your Lordship, and he entirely agrees in the propriety of the course proposed by his Lordship for preserving the dignity of the Sultan.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 2.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 126.)

My Lord,

Therapia, April 7, 1841.

THE inclosed information from Egypt coming from a person extremely well acquainted with what is passing in that country under his eyes, I have sent it home, though I doubt not it will appear in the newspapers ere long.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 2.

*Intelligence from Egypt.**Alexandria, March 26, 1841.*

DURING Mehemet Ali's stay at Cairo, and since his departure from thence, there have been continual council-meetings, under the direction of Ibrahim and Shereeff Pashas, to patch up the financial, agricultural, and military affairs of this most disorderly government.

In regard of the latter, it is confidently asserted, that in February, 1840, the whole military force of Mehemet Ali, without reckoning the Turkish or the Egyptian Navy, amounted to 221,000 men, including irregulars.

Defection and death have reduced that body to 100,000 at most. The new organization is as follows:—

IN EGYPT.

Infantry of the Line, 13 Regiments each, 3 Battalions of 1,200 men and officers	46,800
Ditto Foot Guards, 2 Regiments Ditto	7,200
Cavalry of the Line, 7 Regiments of 6 Squadrons each, 680 men and officers	4,760
Cavalry, Guards—	
1 Regiment Cuirassiers	480
1 Regiment Lancers	480
Artillery, Foot—	1,360
Two Regiments, each 24 batteries, of 6 guns and 16 men, guns, 288	4,608
Artillery, Horse—	
One Ditto, of 6 batteries, guns 36, and 16 men, guns	576
Regulars, men	65,304

Among which are many Syrians of all denominations.

CANDIA.

1 Regiment of Infantry of the Line	3,600
3 Regiments of the Line	10,200

Regulars Total 79,104

To which may be added "Baltagis," Veterans, "Sukal Hales;" those totally unfit for service having been sent to their villages, (without pension or reward,) there remain probably

Irregulars from Syria—Bashi Bozuks, Arnauts, Naploos, Horse and Foot, as well as some few of the tribes Galas, Rosceyles, Fedahan, Lamoor, and Waled Ali, say

Irregulars—Egyptians, Mograbins of Waled Ali, and other tribes (of which there are 30,000 mounted men on the western deserts of Egypt,) in actual service say

In the western deserts of Egypt, Howara, Henedi, Cavat, Orta, &c. &c.

Men 100,104
Egyptian Fleet, Arsenal 15,000

Disposable Force, say 115,104

This is the show they make on paper. The Syrians, of course, would not fight; the irregulars would cut and run the moment they would find "many kicks and no halfpence." Of the Egyptians, after the first check, none would stand to their colours, but to a man would go over to the enemy, when certain of the Sultan's success and assured of a kind reception.

As an instance of the *esprit de corps* prevailing in the Pasha's service, when they lately discharged the Sukal Hales from the ranks, and sent the poor wretches to their villages to shift as best as they may, without recompense for suffering, or provision for premature old age, all who even thus left the army went on their way rejoicing and objects of envy to their less fortunate companions.

To insure their future services, and reward the attachment of the officers of the regiments which returned from Syria in skeleton, the Pasha has cut off one year's pay, to cover the losses of *matériel* unavoidably encountered in a retreat which can only find a parallel in that of Moscow.

The European instructors were last week gratified with an oration that was delivered to them by the Minister of War at Cairo, commendatory of their services, and those among them whose regiments had disappeared (and they were not few) received appointments in the new organization.

The cavalry are now at grass recruiting their horses. Their chief stations are in the Bahera, Menoufieh, and Sherkieyeh Provinces, besides detachments at Cairo, Benisoueff and Fayoum.

The infantry are principally stationed between Cairo and Damietta, and Cairo and Alexandria. Every day brings in new levies from the country, volunteers chained like galley-slaves! The main dépôt is at Cairo. The fortifications at Damietta are continued without the slightest relaxation, and the Rédif are frequently exercised. So much for the submission to the Porte and reduction of the army to 18,000 men! while the late creation of a new French Bey, in the person of the gentleman who was sent out by M. Thiers to render Alexandria a second St. Jean d'Acre, serves as a commentary on the Sultan's late interdict to the nomination of any officer of higher rank than lieutenant!

The "Ferdé" is levying for the year just began (1257), but, withal, under such a system of mystification that no one can well comprehend what is doing, since though it is an undoubted fact, that some have actually paid, the Government people deny it, pretending that it is not for the year 1257, but to make up the arrears of the last five years! That is to say, each place with a given population having been valued at a given sum per annum, and this sum, according to the hocus-pocus system of the finances administration, having, it is said, fallen short through the absence, death, or poverty of some, they are now compelling those who can pay to make up for the default over and above their own share. In this manner it is expected the coffers of His Highness are to be replenished, without in the least violating the Sultan's firman, a thing no longer to be thought of by a faithful vassal. The result of the whole, however, is, as usual in Egypt, that people are made to pay.

No. 3.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received April 30.)

(No. 129.)

My Lord,

Therapia, April 7, 1841.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of an extract of a letter lately received from Cairo, containing information of what is taking place there.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 3.

Extract of a letter from Cairo containing intelligence of what is taking place in Egypt.

ASSICURANO che il Commodore Napier sia stato il primo a consigliare il Pascià di non accettare le condizioni impostegli dalla Porta; e di fatto, quando si tratta di accordare alla famiglia di Mehemet Ali il governo ereditario dell'Egitto, si dovrebbe intendere, che la successione vada in linea recta per diritto di primogenitura. Ma quand'anche il Sultano faccia tale concessione, il Pascià non si sottometterà giammai di buona fede; non farà mai nulla di buono per la prosperità di questa oppressa popolazione, ed eluderà in ogni modo il dispositivo dei trattati, convenzioni, Hatti Scherif, firmani, &c., &c. Bisogna adunque, che la Conferenza di Londra dia l'ultima mano all'opera, e se la Francia volesse unirsi alle Quattro Grandi Potenze, ciò sarebbe meglio, mentre in tal caso Mehemet Ali perderebbe ogni speranza di veder suscitata una guerra Europea.

Adesso si riorganizza una nuova armata di 60 mila uomini, e diversi reggimenti d'Infanteria e Cavalleria riceveranno di già l'ordine di recarsi nel Basso Egitto. Anche gl'istruttori Medici e Farmacisti Europei furono lasciati in attività di servizio.

Pare che della nostra cittadella abbino il progetto di formare una piazza forte, e che le amministrazioni scenderanno nella città.

Si voleva riscuotere il Ferdé del 1257, ma per ora venne sospesa l'esecuzione, limitandosi ad incassare i soldi dell'anno scorso.

Frattanto, sono all'incanto diversi appalti, come quella della sena, cuojo, &c., &c. L'appalto dei vini e spiriti continua come per lo passato, e si vendono perfino alla pubblica subasta 6 giraffe venute dal Sennaar per conto del Governo Egiziano.

E verissimo che l'Egitto appartiene all'Impero Ottomano, però Mehemet Ali vi comanda dispoticamente, ed è da questo che mi necessiterebbe un ordine per Abbas Pascià onde poter esercitar le mie funzioni presso le autorità locali.

Il Signor Walne, Vice Console Britannico, è qui ritornato da Malta nella qualità di Agente della Compagnia delle Indie per ricevere e spedire le valigia delle lettere, e vive ritirato in campagna senza alcuna veste consolare.

Anche qui abbiamo dei giornalieri attacchi di peste, e la mortalità totale si raggrira dai 50 a 60 al giorno, sopra i quali si deve contare 15 a 20 di peste; ciò nonostante nessuna precauzione sanitaria abbiamo fin qui preso, mentre si spera che il miasma non avrà forza per obbligarci ad una rinserra.

Cairo, li 19 Marzo, 1841.

(Translation.)

THERE is a current report that Commodore Napier was the first to advise the Pasha not to accept the conditions imposed on him by the Porte. In fact, when the hereditary government of Egypt is to be granted to the family of Mehemet Ali, it ought to be clearly understood that the succession is to be in the direct line according to the right of primogeniture. But if even the Sultan should make this concession, the Pasha will never submit *bonâ fide*; he will never do any thing to promote the well-being of this oppressed population, and elude by every method the objects had in view by Treaties, Conventions, Hatti-Sheriffs, Firmans, &c., &c. The London Conference therefore should put the last hand to the work, and if France would unite herself to the Four Great Powers, it would have the good effect of depriving Mehemet Ali of every hope of a European war.

A fresh army of sixty thousand men is now raising, and several regiments of foot and horse have already been ordered to march into

Lower Egypt. Even the medical instructors and European pharmacists have been called into active service.

It appears that our city is about to be fortified, and that the administrations are to fix their residence in it.

There was an intention of collecting the "Ferdé" of 1257, but this has been suspended for the present, and only the balances of last year are in the course of exaction.

Meanwhile the different contracts have been put up at auction, such as that of senna, leather, &c., &c. Wine and spirits continue to be farmed out as heretofore, and even the six Giraffes that arrived from Sennaar for account of the Egyptian Government have been put up at auction.

Egypt, doubtless, belongs to the Ottoman Empire, but Mehemet Ali commands there despotically, and he is the person from whom I should stand in need of an order for Abbas Pasha, to enable me to exercise my functions before the local authorities.

Mr. Walne, the British Vice-Consul, is returned hither from Malta, in the capacity of Agent to the East India Company, for the purpose of receiving and forwarding the mails. He lives retired in the country without wearing any consular uniform.

Here, too, we daily experience attacks of the plague, and the total of deaths ranges from fifty to sixty every day, among which from fifteen to twenty must be ascribed to the plague. No sanitary precaution has, for all that, hitherto been taken, since it is hoped that the miasma will not be violent enough to compel us to shut ourselves up from all communication.

Cairo, March 19, 1841.

No. 4.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 39.)

My Lord,

Paris, April 30, 1841.

IN a few words interchanged between M. Guizot and myself this morning, I thought I perceived a stronger disposition than that evinced by His Majesty to sign the Additional Treaty at once, providing the advice given to the Porte included what he (M. Guizot) considered the reasonable demands of Mehemet Ali.

"I will not," he said, "rest assured, submit the conduct of the French Government to the caprice or pretensions of the Pasha of Egypt; but I must have a moral conviction that the Porte will make him such offers as he ought to accept, before I can consider the affair terminated."

I have, &c.,
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 5.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 3.)

(Private and Confidential.)

(Extract.)

Paris, April 30, 1841.

I HAD the honour of a long conversation yesterday with His Majesty the King of the French, from whom I learnt that M. Pontois had recently written to say that the Porte was on the point of adopting the suggestions which had issued from the Conference. I informed His Majesty that even if any delay in this respect should now occur, it was likely to be but of very short duration, since Her Majesty's Government had again given such instructions to Her Majesty's Ambassador at the Porte as could not fail of being promptly effective; and I then asked His Majesty, whether it

might not be well (supposing that the advice we gave to the Sultan was in most respects conformable to what M. Guizot had declared, that Mehemet Ali should accept) to sign the Additional Treaty at once? His Majesty said he did not see what would be gained by such a course. I said, that I thought that we had to consider the case in this point of view. There were two parties, one of whom asked too much, while the other was said to give too little; that the Conference had especially to do with this latter party, and seemed disposed to undertake that it should make all fair concessions; that the other party had on the contrary looked a good deal to France throughout these transactions, and that, therefore, it would be desirable that it should be brought to see at once (what I presumed was the fact), viz., that France did not countenance any of its exaggerated pretensions. In this manner, the general signature of the Additional Treaty would be taken by all parties as a signal for submission, and remove every doubt as to the affair being kept longer in suspense. That I did not know that Her Majesty's Government were particularly anxious about the matter, and that I had received no instructions on the subject, but that still I knew other Governments were most desirous that the state of Europe previous to those transactions should be re-established, and that I thought a manifestation of the same feeling on the part of the French Government could not but have a favourable effect. His Majesty said that he was anxious that the former relations of France with other Powers should not merely be coldly and formally, but sincerely and warmly renewed; but that the matter in question had already been before the Council, and he did not think that the Government would depart from its original resolution of not signing the one Treaty until after the other had fallen to the ground, by the causes for which it was made having ceased, and the purposes it contemplated having been accomplished. His Majesty said, "This once the case, the interests of France, England, and Austria in the East are identical, and I am glad of it, for there is much that disturbs me there. In the interior of the country we may expect troubles: as to the Principalities they are become completely Russian. I understand, indeed, that the Porte wishes some guarantee to be given for the integrity of its empire, and I have always been friendly to such a guarantee, but I suppose Russia would not agree to this. She intrigues, indeed, every where."

No. 6.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 78.)

My Lord,

Vienna, April 22, 1841.

HAVING succeeded in seeing Prince Metternich immediately after the arrival of the messenger Johnson, I was enabled to forward to Lord Ponsonby by the same messenger the Prince's remarks upon your Lordship's despatch No. 77 to that Ambassador. I inclose copy of my despatch to Lord Ponsonby, and your Lordship will perceive from it, as well as from a preceding one, No. 69, that the engagement to offer Egypt hereditarily to Mehemet Ali's family being once fairly acted upon, Prince Metternich will be found ready to co-operate fully with your Lordship upon all subordinate details. This opinion is borne out by his despatch to the Internuncio, whereof he has had the goodness to furnish me with a copy, which I inclose to your Lordship.

The knot of this affair lies in the acceptance by the Porte of the provisions of the Collective Notes signed at London. This being done, it is probable that the affair will end; but if it should not, and if Mehemet Ali, in face of an offer made in conformity with those Protocols by the Porte, should prefer to place himself anew as a rebel, in that case, Prince

Metternich has assured me repeatedly that Austria will be ready to take the position into consideration in concert with her Allies, with the object of finding a solution to it.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 6.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Ponsonby.

My Lord,

Vienna, April 19, 1841.

HAVING by Lord Palmerston's orders communicated to Prince Metternich copy of his Lordship's despatch to your Excellency, No. 77, I am enabled to transmit along with the original His Highness's observations thereupon.

Prince Metternich most positively denied that any proposition had been made by the Plenipotentiaries of Austria and Prussia at London, in compliance with the wishes of the French Government, and he dissented from other points of the historical exposition contained in Lord Palmerston's despatch, but he fully admitted the principle therein stated, that the premature dissolution of the alliance of the Four Powers would encourage Mehemet Ali, and perhaps embolden him to persist in the unreasonable part of his pretensions. Upon this consideration, and in the expectation that the hereditary tenure will have been conceded to him in the spirit of of the Collective Notes and of the instructions which have emanated from London, Prince Metternich will by this occasion instruct the Internuncio to co-operate with your Lordship in order to reduce the remaining differences between the Pasha and the Sultan to a reasonable settlement, upon the principle of mutual concession laid down by Lord Palmerston in an early paragraph of his despatch to your Lordship.

In order to give greater weight to your efforts, Prince Metternich proposes that if the Consuls have not already sailed for Egypt, their departure should be delayed until the Pasha shall have notified his acceptance of the modifications which may have been offered to him by the Sultan.

He also proposes that the dissolution of the alliance of the Four shall in no case be pronounced at Constantinople, nor intimated to Mehemet Ali, but that it shall proceed from the centre of London, and be dependent upon the signature of a treaty with France, and simultaneous therewith.

As these instructions to the Internuncio will probably place your Excellency in communication with him upon various important points treated upon in the answer with which Prince Metternich furnished me to Lord Palmerston's No. 67, I have the honour to inclose a copy of my answer to that despatch.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

P.S.—I have also the honour to inclose copy of my despatch No. 75, in which I communicated to Viscount Palmerston His Highness's entire agreement in the propriety of the course recommended by your Excellency for preserving the dignity of the Sultan.

Inclosure 2 in No. 6.

Prince Metternich to the Baron de Stürmer.

M. le Baron,

Vienne, le 19 Avril, 1841.

JE profite du passage d'un courier Anglais pour adresser à Votre Excellence la présente dépêche.

Ce courier porte à Lord Ponsonby des directions précises de sa Cour

sur la conduite qu'il aura à tenir, et ces instructions coïncident entièrement avec celles que je vous ai transmises le 2 de ce mois. Une expédition de cet Ambassadeur à son Gouvernement en date du 6 Avril, et dont Lord Beauvale a bien voulu me donner connaissance, me fait admettre comme plus que probable qu'il sera déjà entré dans les voies que lui prescrivaient les arrêtés pris dans le centre de Londres le 5 Mars dernier; je me permets d'espérer que je trouverai la confirmation de ce changement de marche dans vos premiers Rapports.

Votre position, M. le Baron, est aujourd'hui fort simplifiée. Comme les ordres que je vous ai transmis le 2 Avril, et qui ne faisaient que confirmer ceux qui vous ont été adressés antérieurement, coïncident avec les directions de Londres que reçoit aujourd'hui Lord Ponsonby, vous vous trouvez placé, ainsi que M. votre Collègue d'Angleterre, sur la stricte ligne des décisions du centre de Londres. M. le Comte de Königsmark et M. de Titow n'auront de leur côté aucune difficulté à suivre la même direction. L'affaire est ainsi bien placée sous le point de vue de l'union entre les Représentans des Quatre Cours, et la manifestation de cette uniformité suffira sans doute pour faire avancer le Divan dans la seule ligne qui puisse lui paraître utile.

La dépêche de Lord Palmerston à Lord Ponsonby dont le présent courrier est le porteur, renferme une remarque d'une valeur incontestable; c'est celle qui fait ressortir les graves inconvéniens qui résulteraient si Méhémet Ali se pénétrait de l'idée, que les Quatre Cours, faute d'accord entre elles, refuseraient leur appui au Sultan. Cette remarque qui nous a toujours été présente dans le cours des derniers tems, nous fait attacher une valeur toute particulière à ce que l'union des Cabinets se fasse clairement apercevoir dans celle de leurs organes à Constantinople. Comme il faut une base pour l'union, et que les arrêtés pris à Londres offrent cette base, vous n'aurez pas de peine à régler votre marche dans un sens conforme au but que nous tenons tous en vue, et qu'il s'agit d'atteindre par tous les moyens qui sont encore possibles. Le 5 Mars on croyait à Londres que l'affaire était finie. Cette conviction était fondée sur la persuasion que la Note Collective du 30 Janvier aurait servi de norme aux explications des Représentans des Quatre Cours envers le Divan. C'est par suite de cette supposition que le renvoi immédiat des Consuls à Alexandrie avait été arrêté dans le centre. Je me permets d'admettre comme probable qu'à Constantinople on aura trouvé prématuré le retour de ces agens en Egypte, et si tel devait en effet avoir été le cas nous le regarderions comme un bonheur.

Rien ne saurait prouver mieux à Méhémet Ali que les Quatre Cours, se maintiennent dans une attitude de solidarité morale utile à la Porte que la suspension du retour des Consuls à Alexandrie jusqu'au moment où sa soumission à son souverain sera complétée, et elle ne le sera que quand elle aura eu lieu non en paroles mais de fait. Le moment de prouver cette soumission par le fait arrivera pour Méhémet Ali après la réponse que la Porte fera à ses représentations; et comme cette réponse aura lieu maintenant en accord avec la pensée des Quatre Cours, il faudra bien que Méhémet Ali se soumette, à moins de prendre de nouveau l'attitude d'un rebelle.

Il aurait sans doute été désirable que la Porte n'eut point été dans le cas de revenir sur quelques unes des dispositions du firman d'investiture, et que celui-ci eut été conçu de prime abord dans un esprit plus analogue aux vues des Cours; toutefois, cette circonstance, quelque regrettable qu'elle soit, ne change rien au fait; ce qu'il importe à notre avis, ce sera:

1°. De faire bien comprendre et admettre par le Divan la nuance que Lord Ponsonby tient très-sagement en vue, d'éviter avec soin que la Porte ne motive ce qu'il accordera à Méhémet Ali comme une concession que Sa Hautesse ferait à la demande de ce Pacha, mais comme une marque de déférence aux conseils de ses Alliés.

2°. Que les Consuls ne retournent pas à Alexandrie avant que Méhémet Ali n'ait confirmé par sa soumission de fait aux arrêtés définitivement pris par Sa Hautesse, les belles paroles qu'il lui coûte si peu de donner.

Je vous prie, M. le Baron, de vous entendre sur ces nuances, en

autant que le besoin pourra encore exister, avec Lord Ponsonby, MM. le Comte de Königsmark et de Titow, et de soutenir avec énergie près du Divan la marche dont vous serez convenu avec MM. vos Collègues.

Recevez, &c.,
(Signé) METTERNICH.

No. 7.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 79.)

My Lord,

Vienna, April 22, 1841.

PRINCE METTERNICH by no means approves the zeal of the Austrian Representatives in London in pressing for the signature of France. He is anxious for the close of the Turco-Egyptian affair upon the conditions established in the centre of London; but he looks for this close at Constantinople, and holds it idle to seek for it elsewhere. According to him, "this affair being once closed, the second affair, which may be termed the isolation of France, will cease of itself, and her signature to the Convention (nugatory in itself) will serve to mark that she has reunited herself to the rest of Europe; but this signature cannot put an end to the Turco-Egyptian affair, and will therefore be valueless if it precede instead of following its close. Its only effect in such a case would be to call France into the regulation of the remaining details, in which, from the turn of events, she has already been enabled to interpose to an extent which is much to be regretted."

The Prince is of opinion that the real moment for France to affix her signature to the Convention will be when we shall learn that an offer of hereditary tenure in conformity with the provisions of the Collective Notes to Chekib Effendi has been made by the Porte to Mehemet Ali. This condition being fulfilled, the Prince thinks it would be a mistake in the French Government to await the acceptance of the offer by the Pasha. It cannot be for the interest or dignity of France to make her conduct dependent upon the will of Mehemet Ali, and if she did so, it could not fail to encourage him in his pretensions, and might thereby retard or entirely impede a conclusion. If on the contrary she sign upon the fact of a reasonable offer being made to him, this decision on her part will have a salutary effect on the settlement of the remaining details of the affair.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 8.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 80.)

My Lord,

Vienna, April 22, 1841.

PRINCE METTERNICH has been informed that the Porte has sent orders to Chekib Effendi to demand anew the guarantee of the Four Powers for the Ottoman Empire. The same demand is to be addressed to France. Prince Metternich has no doubt that it will be answered by a refusal, but he has entered into a reasoning to demonstrate the absurdity of the notion to the Porte. In the same despatch he enters into an examination of the question of the tribute to be paid by Mehemet Ali, and expresses opinions as to the perception of the imposts in various parts of

the Ottoman Empire which merit your Lordship's attention. The Prince having furnished me with an extract from his despatch to the Internuncio, I have the honour to inclose copy of it.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

Inclosure in No. 8.

Extract of a Despatch from Prince Metternich to the Baron de Sturmer.

Vienne, le 20 Avril, 1841.

LE Divan vient de concevoir une bien malheureuse idée en exprimant le vœu de placer l'Empire Ottoman sous la garantie des Grandes Puissances Européennes. Cette idée, qui est fautive dans son point de départ, est à la fois moralement et matériellement inexécutable. L'idée est fautive parce qu'un Etat ne doit jamais accepter, et dès lors bien moins encore demander à d'autres Etats, un service pour lequel il ne saurait offrir en retour une stricte réciprocité. Dans les circonstances où il en est autrement, l'Etat qui accepte la faveur perd par le fait la fleur de son indépendance. Un Etat placé sous une garantie devient un Etat médiatisé; car pour qu'une garantie puisse être accordée il faut que l'Etat qui la réclame fasse un acte de soumission aux volontés de l'Etat qui aura la charge de la défendre. Le garant, pour être quelque chose, doit assumer la charge d'un protecteur, et si un protecteur est pour le moins incommode, plusieurs protecteurs deviennent une charge insoutenable. Il n'y a qu'une forme connue pour atteindre le but de la garantie et cependant éviter les inconvénients de la chose; cette forme est celle de l'alliance défensive. Or, est-ce là ce que veut le Divan? Ce sera à lui à le proposer; mais je ne crois pas qu'il trouvera une issue à sa proposition.

L'idée d'une garantie par les Cinq Puissances est moralement et matériellement inexécutable; car de deux choses l'une: ou la Porte voudra y faire entrer l'idée du retour d'Alger dans ses domaines, et alors la France s'y refusera; ou elle fera abstraction de cette demande, et alors le fait renfermera une renonciation virtuelle à la possession de l'Algérie.

Cette question, M. le Baron, n'a ainsi point de sens, et le Divan ferait mieux de s'occuper de choses plus pratiques.

Les détails sur le tribut dans lesquels vous êtes entré, M. le Baron, dans l'une de vos dépêches du 7 Avril, ne me prouvent autre chose, sinon que le tribut devrait être énoncé dans un chiffre. Ce n'est pas moi qui ai la prétention de le fixer; mais ce qui est certain c'est que tout autre mode de perception réduirait à zéro le revenu de l'Egypte, et ouvrirait la porte à des discussions sans fin, et à des mécomptes inévitables. La différence entre la valeur intrinsèque de la monnaie pourra être réglée au moyen d'un arrangement qui reposerait sur un chiffre fixe, et ce chiffre pourrait être élevé ou diminué à des époques déterminées.

Si tout ne me trompe, la Porte devra abandonner dans la majeure partie de ses domaines le mode de perception nouvellement introduit dans plusieurs d'entre elles. En faisant percevoir les impôts par ses propres receveurs, elle n'aura fait qu'augmenter les exactions pour ses sujets et les non-valeurs pour son trésor. L'abonnement fixe, fondé sur une loi tutélaire pour les contribuables, me semble le seul mode de perception possible dans l'Empire Ottoman. Les ineptes novateurs dans cet Empire ont cru qu'il suffisait d'emprunter des formes et des noms à la civilisation Chrétienne pour s'assurer les mêmes effets. Ils ne les obtiendront pas, et retomberont dans les usages d'un passé qu'ils auront contribué à détruire. Alors que restera-t-il? Personne ne l'ignore plus que moi.

No. 9.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.

(No. 88.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, May 4, 1841.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch, No. 69, of the 14th ultimo, reporting Prince Metternich's views about the rule of succession in Egypt, and the tribute to be paid by Mehemet Ali to the Sultan, I have to inform your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government consider those views to be sound and practical.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 10.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.

(No. 91.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, May 8, 1841.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch, No. 78, of the 22nd ultimo, reporting that Prince Metternich had repeatedly assured you that if Mehemet Ali, instead of accepting an offer made to him by the Sultan, in conformity with the recommendations of the Four Powers, should place himself anew in rebellion towards the Porte, Austria would in such case be ready to take the matter into consideration, in concert with her Allies, for the purpose of coming to some arrangement. I have to instruct your Excellency to express to Prince Metternich the satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at this declaration.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 11.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.

(No. 97.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, May 10, 1841.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch, No. 79, of the 22nd ultimo, reporting Prince Metternich's opinion as to the moment at which it would be most expedient that France should affix her signature to the Convention, the draft of which was initialed on the 15th of March, I have to state to your Excellency, that Her Majesty's Government have felt great pleasure in learning the very sound and judicious view taken by Prince Metternich of the matters treated of in this despatch. It is perfectly true, as his Highness observes, that the isolation of France can only cease when that Treaty, in the execution of which the Four Powers are engaged, and to which France is not a party, shall have been fully carried into effect; for the isolation of France arises from the fact that the Four Powers have undertaken a political operation which France declined to take part in; and when that operation is finished, and the Four Powers fall back into the ordinary state of quiescence in which all Powers are when they are not actively engaged in any combined measures with Allies, then the Four Powers and France will all be equally isolated; and this is a distinction which seems to have been either overlooked or not understood in France.

The French think that the isolation of France will cease by the signature of the proposed Treaty, and that this Treaty will make France enter again into "the European concert;" but the proposed Treaty contains no stipulations for action or for concert; it merely records the determination of the Great Powers to respect the decision and intention of the Sultan in a matter with regard to which he is entitled, as an independent Sovereign, to declare his will.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 12.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.

(No. 98.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, May 10, 1841.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch, No. 80, of the 22nd ultimo, reporting Prince Metternich's opinion that it would not, in the present state of things, be expedient for the Powers of Europe to enter into a guarantee of the integrity of the Turkish Empire, I have to inform your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government entirely agree with Prince Metternich in that opinion. But Her Majesty's Government cannot quite concur with Prince Metternich in the reasons which, in his despatch to Baron Stürmer, he gives for that opinion.

Prince Metternich argues, that a State which is guaranteed loses thereby its independence, and becomes a mediatized State; that the guaranteeing Power becomes a protecting Power, and that, while it is inconvenient to have even one protector, to have several would be an intolerable burthen; that in fact there is but one form of guarantee free from these inconveniences, and that is a defensive alliance.

Now Her Majesty's Government quite admit that when a single Power guarantees another, such an engagement does place the weaker Power in a situation of dependence upon the stronger, which must derogate from the freedom of action, and from the entire independence of the weaker Power, and must give the stronger one a preponderant influence. But this effect cannot be produced in the same degree when the guarantee is given by several Powers; because it is probable that those Powers would all have different views and wishes, and these opposite and conflicting impulses would destroy each other.

At all events, Austria has not always held these opinions, because she joined with the other Four Powers in guaranteeing, not merely the integrity, but the independence of Belgium; proving thereby, that she did not consider a guarantee of integrity as being necessarily destructive of independence; and the result, in the case of Belgium, has not shown that the guarantee has deprived Belgium of any portion of her independence.

Again, France, Great Britain, and Russia, guaranteed the integrity and independence of the kingdom of Greece; and although foreign influence has, during the reign of King Otho, exerted a most injurious sway in Greece, yet this evil has had no connexion with the guarantee.

The evil of a guarantee to the State to which it is given is, that it leads such State to rely upon foreign aid for its defence; and then, when the moment comes when that aid is wanted, it may, upon some pretence or other, be withheld, or it may arrive too late.

In the present case of Turkey, if the *status quo* of 1839 had been maintained, and if Mehemet Ali had been left in occupation of Syria, the Sultan would have been constantly exposed to an imminent and serious danger, and there might have been a reason why the Four Powers should have entered into engagements to come to his assistance against Mehemet Ali whenever wanted; but now that Mehemet has been driven back into Egypt, and the Sultan has recovered possession of Syria and of his fleet, and may by good management and perseverance make himself stronger by sea and by land than Mehemet Ali can possibly be, there seems to be

no standing danger against which it can be necessary for the Allies to guarantee the Sultan; and therefore it would, on many accounts, be better that Turkey and the other Powers of Europe should stand towards each other in the ordinary relations in which independent States reciprocally stand.

But Prince Metternich's observation as to the effect which a guarantee of the integrity of the Turkish Empire by the Five Powers, France included, would have, seems perfectly well founded; and that would alone constitute a weighty reason why the Sultan should not desire to have such a guarantee.

As to that part of Prince Metternich's despatch to Baron Stürmer in which he expresses an opinion that the Sultan would do better to revert to the old system of selling pashalics and farming his revenues, rather than adhere to the newly introduced plan of collecting the taxes by receivers of his own, Her Majesty's Government cannot concur in that opinion, and would see with extreme regret its adoption by the Sultan. They look upon the change which the Sultan has made in this part of his administration as an improvement of the very greatest importance, as regards both the interests of the Sultan and the welfare of the people; and though this reform, like many others which involve great changes of system, may require some time to come fully and completely into operation, there cannot be a shadow of a doubt that it would be calamitous to rescind it.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 13.

Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 23.)

My Lord,

Berlin, May 4, 1841.

I HAVE received your Lordship's despatch, No. 24, of the 21st of April, giving me instructions to remonstrate with Baron Werther against his presumed intention to break engagements accepted by the Treaty of July.

Your Lordship founds this instruction on my despatch of the 14th of April, No. 18; but Baron Werther has not adhered to the language he held then, and which I may suppose arose in a moment of impatient irritability at the delay that attended the signature of the Convention, or from not having understood the views of Prince Metternich, whose steps he will closely follow. I will therefore reserve your Lordship's instructions until their execution becomes necessary.

Mr. Bulwer, in his despatch to your Lordship, No. 27, says, that France will attempt to form a closer alliance with Austria and Prussia. I can in some measure corroborate this opinion, having been told that Count Bresson would return here with instructions to cultivate the friendship of Prussia. His speech in the Chamber of Peers may be looked upon as the precursor of his efforts. The projected alliance between France, Austria, and Prussia, being made in a pacific tendency, there is no reason (in my opinion) to contravene it.

Should any alliance become dangerous to Great Britain, such is now her power, and such is the desire of all nations to maintain relations of friendship with Her Majesty, that the danger attending the alliance might be immediately dissolved.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) WILLIAM RUSSELL.

No. 14.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

(No. 110.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, May 10, 1841.

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a Note* which the Plenipotentiaries of the Four Powers have addressed to Chekib Effendi, in reply to his communication of the instructions which he had received from the Porte, dated the 1st of April, requesting the concurrence of the Four Powers in removing the difficulties which have arisen in the settlement of the differences between the Porte and Mehemet Ali.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

P.S.—I inclose a copy of the Note† from Chekib Effendi, in which he transmitted to me the instructions from his Court mentioned in this despatch.

No. 15.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

(No. 113.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, May 11, 1841.

I HAVE to instruct your Excellency to state to the Porte that the Collective Note from the Plenipotentiaries of the Four Powers to the Turkish Ambassador, of the 10th of May, of which a copy is inclosed in my despatch No. 110 of yesterday, contains the opinion and advice of Her Majesty's Government upon the points still remaining unsettled between Mehemet Ali and the Sultan.

The Representatives of the Four Powers cannot admit the supposition that Mehemet Ali can seriously mean to retract the full and unconditional submission which he made through Captain Fanshawe; and they must assume that when he receives the communication which the Sultan will no doubt found upon this Collective Note, he will acquiesce in the other conditions of the Separate Act of the Treaty of July.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 16.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 44.)

My Lord,

Paris, May 7, 1841.

THE Count Appony read to me this day a despatch dated 26th April, which he had received from his Court, and which he communicated yesterday to M. Guizot. The object of that despatch was to state,—

1st. That Prince Metternich thought it perfectly natural that the French Government should decline signing the Additional Convention, until the questions arising out of the Treaty of 15th July were terminated.

* See Part III., p. 349.

† See Part III., p. 345.

2ndly. That he should consider that those questions were terminated when the Porte should adopt the suggestions recently made to it by the Four Powers; and that consequently he should expect M. Guizot in such case to sign the initialed arrangement without further delay.

M. Guizot said that he should certainly not place his actions under the control of Mehemet Ali, nor allow that person's conduct to dictate his own; but that saying thus much he should say no more, but hold himself perfectly free to act as he should think proper when he saw the new conditions offered by the Sultan.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 17.

Viscount Palmerston to Lieutenant-Colonel Napier.

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, May 14, 1841.

I HAVE to instruct you, immediately on the receipt of this despatch, to proceed to Alexandria to demand from Mehemet Ali the release of the Syrian soldiers, whom he promised Sir Charles Napier to dismiss; and you will accompany those soldiers back to Syria.

I have applied to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to provide you with a passage on board the steam-vessel which conveys the mail from Gibraltar to Malta; and the Admiral at Malta will be instructed to send you on to Alexandria, and also to make arrangements for conveying the Syrian soldiers, when released by Mehemet Ali, from Egypt to the coast of Syria.

You will report your proceedings in execution of this instruction directly to me, and also to Colonel Bridgeman, or the officer commanding the British detachments on shore in Syria, to whose orders you will be subject while employed on this service; and who will be instructed to direct you to return to your regiment when the service is completed.

I inclose a despatch to Colonel Hodges, directing him to join you in demanding from Mehemet Ali the release of these Syrians; and you will deliver the same to Colonel Hodges, if he should be at Alexandria, when you arrive there. But you will not delay making the demand, if Colonel Hodges should not have arrived.

No. 18.

Viscount Palmerston to Colonel Hodges.

(No. 5.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, May 14, 1841.

I HAVE to acquaint you that Lieutenant-Colonel Napier has been instructed to proceed to Alexandria, to demand from Mehemet Ali the performance of the promise which Mehemet Ali made to Sir Charles Napier, that he would dismiss the Syrian soldiers who accompanied the Egyptian army in its retreat from Syria.

I have to instruct you to join with Lieutenant-Colonel Napier in making this demand; and to point out to Mehemet Ali that any military advantage which he may fancy he might gain by retaining these men in his service, would be insignificant, compared with the injury he would do himself if he were to break faith in this matter with the British Government, by violating an engagement made by him to one of Her Majesty's officers.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 19.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

(No. 119.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, May 14, 1841.

I INCLOSE for your Excellency's information a copy of an instruction which I have given to Lieutenant-Colonel Napier, directing him to proceed to Alexandria to demand the release of the Syrian soldiers whom Mehemet Ali promised Sir Charles Napier to dismiss; and a copy of an instruction which I have sent to Colonel Hodges, directing him to join with Lieutenant-Colonel Napier in making this demand.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 20.

Baron Brunnow to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 18.)

My Lord,

Londres, ce 15 Mai, 1841.

IL y a aujourd'hui deux mois que nous avons paraphé la Convention conclue par les Cours de Russie, d'Autriche, de France, de la Grande Bretagne, et de Prusse, avec Sa Hautesse le Sultan, relative au principe de la fermeture des détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore.

Votre Excellence voudra bien se rappeler qu'à l'époque où nous avons conclu cette transaction, je me suis décidé à y concourir, avant même d'avoir reçu les Plein-pouvoirs qui m'étaient nécessaires pour signer cet Acte.

A cette époque, ayant déjà sollicité auprès du Cabinet Impérial l'envoi de mes Plein-pouvoirs et me trouvant dans l'attente de les recevoir, je ne vous ai pas laissé ignorer qu'il me paraissait plus régulier de ne procéder à la conclusion de l'Acte projeté que lorsque j'aurais reçu à cet effet l'ordre formel qui devait m'autoriser à y apposer ma signature.

Quelque fondés que fussent les motifs qui m'ont porté à émettre alors cette opinion dans nos entretiens avec MM. les Plénipotentiaires d'Autriche et de Prusse, deux considérations, vous le savez, m'ont décidé à ne pas y insister :

1°. J'ai partagé avec vous le désir de ne pas retarder l'accomplissement d'une œuvre de conciliation qui, en manifestant l'accord heureusement rétabli entre les Cinq Puissances, ferait cesser l'isolement volontaire de la France, et offrirait ainsi à la paix de l'Europe un nouveau gage de sécurité.

2°. J'ai reconnu le besoin d'accélérer autant que possible le moment où nos Alliés du Continent seraient libérés du fardeau que leur imposent les préparatifs militaires qu'ils ont été obligé de faire en présence des armemens de la France; attitude mutuellement onéreuse que nous avions tous à cœur de faire cesser, en assurant enfin à l'Europe le bienfait d'une paix réelle, sans défiance et sans armes.

Telles sont, Mylord, les raisons qui m'ont déterminé à prendre sur moi de concourir à la transaction que nous avons arrêtée, avant que les distances qui me séparent de mon Cabinet m'eussent permis de recevoir les Plein-pouvoirs que j'avais sollicités.

En prenant cette détermination, j'avais la conviction que les motifs de ma conduite seraient honorés de l'approbation de Sa Majesté l'Empereur.

Cet espoir n'a pas tardé à être confirmé: dans le plus court délai possible, les Plein-pouvoirs que j'avais sollicités me sont parvenus. Et par un effet de cette constance de vues et de principes qui ont invariablement guidé le Cabinet Impérial durant toute la crise du Levant, l'Empereur a daigné me renvoyer le même Plein-pouvoir en vertu duquel j'ai

signé la Convention du 15 Juillet; Plein-pouvoir dont Sa Majesté avait daigné me munir dès l'origine pour signer un Acte à cinq sur la pacification de l'Orient. Il suffira de la simple date de ce document pour démontrer une fois de plus, que jamais nous n'avons voulu exclure la France de ce pacte mémorable, puisque, si elle avait voulu y participer, j'étais pleinement autorisé à conclure et à signer avec elle la Convention de Juillet.

C'est en vertu de ce même Plein-pouvoir que l'Empereur m'a autorisé maintenant à signer la Convention relative aux détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore; transaction dont Sa Majesté a daigné approuver la teneur telle que nous l'avons arrêtée de concert par la Convention paraphée le 15 Mars.

Me trouvant muni à cet effet des ordres formels de ma Cour, et ayant reçu l'assentiment de l'Empereur à l'œuvre de conciliation que nos soins ont été employés à accomplir, je ne saurais m'empêcher de rappeler aujourd'hui, que les motifs qui nous ont décidé dans le tems à accélérer cette œuvre, continuent à subsister dans toute leur force. Aujourd'hui comme alors, l'Europe réclame de nous ce gage de paix que nos efforts et nos travaux réunis ont eu pour but de lui offrir.

Cependant, ce résultat si désirable a été différé jusqu'à ce jour par des obstacles indépendans de notre volonté.

En effet, à l'époque où nous avons définitivement arrêté la rédaction de la Convention relative aux détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore, le Cabinet des Tuileries a hésité de signer cet Acte, et n'a autorisé son Plénipotentiaire qu'à le parapher.

Animés d'un sincère désir de conciliation, nous n'avons pas voulu élever alors une contestation fâcheuse sur un simple délai que nous avions lieu de considérer comme de peu de durée; et dans cette persuasion nous avons apprécié avec la plus grande équité les motifs de l'hésitation qu'éprouvait le Cabinet des Tuileries. Elle provenait nommément de l'appréhension que le Ministère Français avait conçue, que de nouvelles difficultés pourraient survenir à Alexandrie à la suite des firmans émanés à Constantinople le 13 Février; et qu'au milieu des complications auxquelles cet état de choses pourrait conduire, les Cours signataires de la Convention du 15 Juillet seraient appelées peut-être à interposer en faveur de la Porte des démarches et des actes ultérieurs, auxquels la France devrait rester étrangère.

Dans cet état d'incertitude, le Cabinet des Tuileries a jugé préférable, dans l'intérêt de sa position, de ne pas apposer sa signature à la Convention projetée, aussi longtemps que resterait encore ouverte l'éventualité d'une intervention à laquelle la France ne participerait point.

Si nous avons compris cette difficulté, et si nous avons témoigné alors de justes égards au Cabinet des Tuileries en ne recusant pas les motifs qui l'engageaient à différer la signature de la Convention arrêtée à Londres le 15 Mars, qu'il me soit permis de dire aujourd'hui que les motifs de ce retard ont complètement cessé d'exister.

La Porte Ottomane a désiré elle-même applanir les difficultés qui s'étaient élevées au sujet de l'interprétation de quelques unes des dispositions des firmans du 13 Février. Dans ce but, elle a chargé son Ambassadeur à Londres de nous adresser la communication dont Chékib Effendi s'est acquitté le 27 Avril. La réponse que nous venons de lui faire est conçue de manière à éloigner toute incertitude sur les questions de détail qu'il restait à résoudre. Elle annonce en même tems dans les termes les plus positifs: "Que nous ne pouvons considérer la soumission de Méhémet Ali que comme absolue, et par conséquent l'Affaire Turco-Egyptienne comme terminée."

Les chances d'une nouvelle complication que le Cabinet Français avait prévue au mois de Mars dernier, se trouvent ainsi heureusement écartées. Nos soins réunis ont été consacrés à empêcher que cette éventualité ne vint à se réaliser. S'il restait aujourd'hui une seule chance de complication future, ce serait celle de voir Méhémet Ali, enhardi par la condescendance de la Porte, élever de rechef ses prétentions au point de

faire surgir de nouvelles contestations, de manière à mettre en péril la paix à peine rétablie dans le Levant.

Or, il est évident, que tant que Méhémet Ali conserve l'espoir de voir subsister encore un reste de mésintelligence entre les Grandes Puissances de l'Europe, il fondera sur cet espoir tous ses calculs; dès lors, il se montrera moins traitable envers la Porte; multipliera ses demandes et ses exigences; et se livrera de nouveau aux mêmes espérances qu'il a nourries à l'époque où il croyait pouvoir exploiter au profit de son ambition le manque d'accord qui régnait entre les Cinq Puissances.

Tous ces calculs de Méhémet Ali tomberont lorsqu'il verra que la France, replacée aujourd'hui sous une administration sagement pacifique, s'est rapprochée des autres Cabinets pour attester en commun avec eux le respect qu'elle porte à l'inviolabilité des droits de souveraineté du Sultan, ainsi que son sincère désir de voir se consolider le repos de l'Empire Ottoman.

En manifestant ces déterminations dans un but de conservation et de paix, la France démontrera ainsi à Méhémet Ali qu'il ne saurait compter sur elle s'il essayait de recheker de porter atteinte aux droits de souveraineté de la Porte, ou s'il cherchait encore une fois à compromettre le repos de l'Empire Ottoman.

Dès lors, le Pacha d'Egypte, voyant l'unanimité des Grandes Puissances parfaitement rétablie, se résignerait à se renfermer dans les bornes de l'obéissance, et renoncerait à élever envers la Porte des prétentions inadmissibles qui, tôt ou tard, finiraient par conduire à un renouvellement d'hostilité.

Dans l'état actuel des choses, le Gouvernement Français, s'il différerait encore la signature de la Convention que nous avons conclue, risquerait donc d'encourager, sans le vouloir, les espérances de Méhémet Ali; de hausser ses prétentions envers la Porte, et de multiplier ainsi les causes qui tendent à prolonger cette crise dont la France, de concert avec les Quatre Cours Alliées, désirerait hâter le terme.

Dans la circonstance du moment, la signature de la Convention projetée, par l'effet moral qu'elle devra produire sur Méhémet Ali, me paraît donc le meilleur moyen à employer pour le retenir dans les bornes de la soumission et du devoir, et pour assurer ainsi la stabilité du repos que toutes les Puissances de l'Europe ont également à cœur de raffermir dans le Levant.

Telles sont, Mylord, les considérations d'un intérêt général sur lesquelles je me permets d'appeler votre attention. Je m'acquitte de ce devoir avec la certitude de rencontrer par là vos intentions ainsi que celles de mes Collègues d'Autriche et de Prusse. Pour ma part, ayant reçu l'ordre formel de signer la Convention que nous avons conclue il y a deux mois, je croirais mal répondre à la sollicitude de l'Empereur, si je ne signalais pas aujourd'hui l'importance qu'il y a à ne pas différer davantage l'accomplissement d'une œuvre de conciliation que l'Europe attend depuis si longtemps, et qu'elle regarde avec confiance comme un nouveau gage de l'affermissement de la paix générale.

Veillez, &c.,
(Signé) BRUNNOW.

No. 21.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 52.)

My Lord,

Paris, May 14, 1841.

YOUR Lordship will probably be already aware, since I understand that the papers just communicated to me by Count Appony have been forwarded to London, that the Reis Effendi addressed a memorandum on the 19th of April to the Ambassadors of the Four Powers, informing them of the intentions of the Sultan, (acquiescing thereby in the representations of

his Allies,) to award the hereditary grant of the Pashalic of Egypt to Mehemet Ali, to give him the nomination of the officers in the army up to the rank of Colonel, (that title being included,) and to change the Tribute, so that instead of the fourth part of the revenue of Egypt, it should be a fixed sum, that sum to be determined by the existing resources of the country. I hear, in reference to this, that the Austrian Internuncio recommended Rifaat to adopt the sum of 15,000 purses (something less, I believe, than 2,000,000 of Francs,) Rifaat himself being inclined to insist on 18,000 purses. The Reis Effendi at the same time, requests the Ambassadors to define with more accuracy than they have yet done, the manner in which they considered that the laws of the rest of the Turkish empire should be applied to Mehemet's Viceroyalty; to which I understand, that the Representative of Austria replied by saying, that while it was no doubt necessary that the general system of government proclaimed by the Porte should extend throughout the Sultan's dominions, he did not doubt but that this would be done with due reference to the peculiar circumstances that prevailed in the different portions of the Turkish empire;—an evasive reply, though probably the only one which his instructions enabled him to give. Count Appony first communicated the dispatches containing the abovementioned information to the King of the French, and His Majesty, I understand, made some remarks expressive of regret that Mehemet had not been given unlimited powers as to the nomination of the officers of his army. But M. Guizot said to the Count, that he considered the arrangement satisfactory, and that as soon as it was notified to M. de Bourqueney by the Conference in London, the French Chargé d'Affaires would have instructions to sign the Treaty of the 15th March.

I also saw M. Guizot this morning before seeing Count Appony, and being then aware of the general nature of the intelligence which the Count afterwards gave me in detail, asked his Excellency whether he did not now feel ready to conclude the Separate Convention to which I have just alluded? M. Guizot said, "Yes, I shall in all probability give Bourqueney instructions to that effect; still I should first wish to hear that the firman had been actually sent. Of this, however," he continued, "be sure, I shall never submit my decision to Mehemet Ali's."

A council is to be held this day on the subject.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 22.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 132.)

My Lord,

Therapia, April 14, 1841.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copies of an official Note I this day received from his Excellency the Internuncio, and my reply to it.

I hope my answer will show sufficiently, for the present occasion, what I have done. I have strictly followed your Lordship's instructions according to my understanding of the documents referred to therein.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 22.

Baron de Sturmer to Viscount Ponsonby.

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

Constantinople, 13 Avril, 1841.

L'ESTAFETTE arrivée de Vienne hier au soir m'a apporté la dépêche ci-jointe que je m'empresse de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence, en la priant de me la renvoyer dès qu'elle en aura pris lecture.

Vous y verrez, M. l'Ambassadeur, qu'il m'est enjoint de la manière la plus péremptoire d'insister auprès de la Porte pour qu'il plaise à Sa Hautesse de se conformer sans délai ultérieur aux vœux de ses augustes Alliées.

Tous mes efforts doivent dès lors être consacrés à ce but, et j'ose prier votre Excellence de me dire si je puis compter dans cette circonstance sur son concours? Celui de nos Collègues de Russie et de Prusse m'est déjà assuré, et M. le Comte de Königsmark étant venu en ville par hasard ce matin, nous avons pu en conférer aussitôt avec M. de Titow, et sommes tombés d'accord, dès aujourd'hui, de tenir à la Porte un langage parfaitement uniforme. Nous serions heureux de voir votre Excellence se joindre à nous et même de se mettre à notre tête, afin de pouvoir ainsi constater de nouveau aux yeux de la Porte et du monde l'union qui jusqu'ici a présidé à tous les actes de l'alliance.

Veuillez, &c.,
(Signé) STURMER.

Inclosure 2 in No. 22.

Viscount Ponsonby to the Baron de Sturmer.

Monsieur l'Internonce,

Therapia, April 14, 1841.

I HAD the honour to receive this day at a few minutes before 4 o'clock your Excellency's official Note dated the 13th instant, and I reply to it without a moment's delay. Your Excellency has communicated to me a despatch you have received from Vienna, containing directions for the conduct your Excellency is to pursue, and your Excellency expresses your desire that I should act in co-operation with your Excellency and both our Colleagues of Russia and Prussia, in furtherance of the measure you are directed to adopt. If I am not in error, the measure you are to take, is to make known to the Sublime Porte the opinions and views of the Conference at London, as that opinion, or those views, are stated and exposed in the Collective Note of the Representatives of the Four Powers addressed to Chekib Effendi, and dated 13th of March, 1841, and in Lord Palmerston's instructions No. 49, dated 16th of March, 1841, and addressed to me.

I have already had the honour to acquaint you, that I had not only made known to the Ottoman Minister the contents of those documents, stating at the same time the opinion I entertained of the anxiety of the Allies to bring the Egyptian Question to a termination at any rate; but I also communicated to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the Collective Note and Lord Palmerston's instructions in original. Your Excellency will therefore be satisfied that I have already done in my individual capacity that which is so fervently urged in the despatch your Excellency has received.

Your Excellency will, I am sure, have the goodness to acquaint me what you and our Colleagues may desire to have done further for making known the opinion and views of the Conference to the Sublime Porte; I mean the mode of acting. Your Excellency is, no doubt, fully informed of the fact that the Ottoman Ministers have come to a decision to modify the Article of succession to the Government of Egypt, with the view of rendering it agreeable to the wishes of the Conference. That the Ottoman Ministers have also modified, with a similar intention, the Article of the military rank to be conferred by the Pasha of Egypt, and that they are engaged in considering in what manner the Article of tribute may be modified so as to meet the views of the Conference.

Your Excellency is also acquainted with the disposition manifested in the instructions sent by Rechid Pasha to Chekib Effendi, to arrange this last-mentioned point; and no doubt your Excellency will esteem that to be an evidence from which we may draw the conclusion, that the Sublime Porte is desirous to gratify the wishes of the High Allies of the Sultan,

and may be supposed likely to act in the spirit of concession whenever the wishes of those Powers shall have been made known to the Sublime Porte.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 23.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 133.)

My Lord,

Therapia, April 14, 1841.

THE Sublime Porte has come to the resolution,—

1st. That the Government of Egypt shall be inherited by the eldest son.

2nd. That Mehemet Ali shall have the right to appoint officers to any rank in the army below that of General of Brigade; but a General of Brigade being a Pasha, the Porte refuses to allow Mehemet Ali to name Pashas.

3rd. The tribute will be fixed at a given sum.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 24.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 138.)

My Lord,

Therapia, April 21, 1841.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a memorandum from the Porte, and my answer.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 24.

Memorandum from the Sublime Porte to the Representatives of the Four Powers. April 19, 1841.

(Traduction.)

SA Hautesse eu égard aux conseils bienveillans que les Hautes Cours Alliées viennent encore de lui donner, et voulant donner de nouveaux témoignages de ses faveurs souveraines dont elle a déjà usé envers Méhémet Ali Pacha, s'empresse de déclarer que:—

L'hérédité du gouvernement de l'Egypte est accordée à Méhémet Ali Pacha, à condition qu'il exécutera complètement, ainsi qu'il le dit dans sa lettre, les traités et les autres engagements de la Sublime Porte actuellement existans et à être conclus à l'avenir avec toutes les Puissances Amies; la succession au gouvernement devant passer en ligne droite dans la postérité mâle, de l'aîné à l'aîné, parmi les fils et les petits-fils à chaque vacance, la nomination de celui qui devra être Gouverneur de l'Egypte se fera de la part de la Sublime Porte.

On ne songe plus à établir pour tribut le quart des revenus; mais le tribut sera proportionné aux revenus actuels de l'Egypte; et le quantum qui aura été fixé sera perçu comme un tout à être payé annuellement.

Quant aux grades militaires, on pourra nommer en Egypte jusqu'au

rang de Colonel; lorsqu'il s'agira d'un rang supérieur à celui de Colonel on le demandera à la Sublime Porte qui l'accordera gracieusement.

On est après de faire des arrangements à tous ces égards.

Mais dans la lettre arrivée de la part de Méhémet Ali Pacha, il n'y a rien de précis relativement à la mise complètement à exécution des lois de la Sublime Porte en Egypte: or, c'est là un point établi par l'Acte Séparé du Traité d'Alliance; et comme on ne peut pas savoir ce que les Puissances Alliées diront, lorsqu'elles verront de la part de Méhémet Ali, soit à présent soit à l'avenir, des procédés montrant qu'il n'a pas accepté et qu'il ne remplit pas une condition qui est de l'essence du Traité, les Ministres de la Sublime Porte ont jugé qu'il est important de demander à votre Excellence quelles sont ses notions précises là-dessus, et quelle communication elle aurait à faire sur ce point?

Nous vous prions donc de vouloir bien nous faire savoir par écrit ce que vous avez à dire sur le point dont nous venons de parler; et c'est pour cela que nous vous remettons le présent Mémoire.

Inclosure 2 in No. 24.

Viscount Ponsonby to Rifaat Pasha.

Therapia, April 26, 1841.

THE Undersigned has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of a Memorandum communicated to him from the Sublime Porte by his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated 19th April, wherein, after having stated the measures determined upon by the Sublime Porte with reference to Mehemet Ali, the Sublime Porte is pleased to desire to have his opinion in writing upon a point which is stated as follows: "Mais dans la lettre arrivée de la part de Méhémet Ali Pacha, il n'y a rien de précis relativement à la mise complètement à exécution des lois de la Sublime Porte en Egypte; or, c'est là un point établi par l'Acte Séparé du Traité d'Alliance; et comme on ne peut pas savoir ce que les Puissances Alliées diront, lorsqu'elles verront de la part de Méhémet Ali, soit à présent soit à l'avenir, des procédés montrant qu'il n'a pas accepté et qu'il ne remplit pas une condition qui est de l'essence du Traité, les Ministres de la Sublime Porte ont jugé qu'il est important de demander à votre Excellence quelles sont ses notions précises là-dessus, et quelle communication elle aurait à faire sur ce point?"

The Undersigned, in compliance with the desire expressed by the Sultan, replies in writing and says, that he is at present equally as ignorant as the Sublime Porte, what will be the opinion of the Allies upon the points stated by the Sublime Porte, and is unable to offer any advice as to the further measures of the Sublime Porte with reference to Mehemet Ali.

The Undersigned expects to receive instructions from his Government in a week or ten days, which will enable him to communicate to the Sublime Porte the feelings and the wishes of the British Government; and until the Undersigned is thereby authorized to speak upon the subject in question, he must beg that the Sublime Porte will excuse his silence.

The Undersigned has, &c.,
(Signed) **PONSONBY.**

No. 25.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 139.)

My Lord,

Therapia, April 21, 1841.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of a Note I wrote to the Internuncio in consequence of my not having had a reply to my note of the 14th. I have this evening received his Excellency's answer, and I inclose a copy of it.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) **PONSONBY.**

Inclosure 1 in No. 25.

Viscount Ponsonby to the Baron de Sturmer.

Monsieur l'Internonce,

Therapia, April 19, 1841.

ON the 14th instant I had the honour to receive an official note from your Excellency desiring me to inform you if I was disposed to co-operate with your Excellency and our colleagues in carrying into effect the instructions received from our Courts, &c., &c.

I had the honour to reply to your Excellency's note the same day, and after having, at some length, explained what my conduct had been, and (being desirous to concur with my colleagues) I requested your Excellency to have the goodness to inform me in what way your Excellency and our colleagues desired that I should act, in furtherance of the instructions of our Governments.

This is the fifth day since I sent my note, and not having had the honour to hear from you, I take the liberty to express my hope that your Excellency will favour me with a reply, as it is necessary for me to state to my Government everything connected with this affair.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) **PONSONBY.**

Inclosure 2 in No. 25.

Baron de Sturmer to Viscount Ponsonby.

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

Constantinople, 21 Avril, 1841.

J'AI reçu hier matin la lettre que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser avant-hier.

Le Sultan venant enfin de prendre à l'égard du Pacha d'Egypte des résolutions conformes aux conseils et aux vœux de ses Augustes Alliées, et ces résolutions nous ayant été annoncées hier officiellement, notre tâche, ce me semble, est accomplie. La question que vous voulez bien me faire, M. l'Ambassadeur, sur le genre de co-opération que nous attendions de votre part, nos Collègues de Russie et de Prusse et moi, devient donc sans objet.

Si je n'ai pas répondu à cette même question que renfermait déjà votre lettre du 13 de ce mois, c'est que vous m'y aviez assuré que vous aviez fait tout ce qui avait dépendu de vous, en communiquant à la Porte les actes de la Conférence de Londres et les instructions de Lord Palmerston du 16 Mars, et en lui faisant connaître en même temps le vif désir des Puissances Alliées de voir l'affaire d'Egypte conduite à terme "at any rate." Or, c'était précisément ce que nous voulions proposer à votre Excellence de faire, et il ne nous restait ainsi plus rien à lui demander.

Veuillez, &c.,
(Signé) **STURMER.**

No. 26.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

(No. 122.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, May 18, 1841.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the letter which you addressed to the Internuncio on the 14th of April, of which a copy is inclosed in your despatch, No. 132, of that day, and in which you stated the measures you had taken to prevail upon the Porte to act upon the suggestions of the Four Powers, with respect to the modifications to be made by the Sultan in the conditions annexed to the grant to Mehemet Ali of the hereditary government of Egypt.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 27.

Lord William Russell to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 27.)

My Lord,

Berlin, May 19, 1841.

I COMMUNICATED to Baron Werther your Lordship's opinion as to the guarantee of the integrity of the Turkish Empire demanded by the Ottoman Minister at London. His Excellency agreed with your Lordship; but the weakness of the Turkish Government, and the insurrection breaking out at the extremities of the empire, make it doubtful whether a guarantee of integrity may not soon become politic.

Baron Werther likewise approved of your Lordship's opinion as to the time at which it would be expedient that France should affix her signature to the Oriental Convention; at the same time he found your Lordship's view of the present and future position of the European Powers, especially of France in respect to isolation, clear and judicious.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) WM. RUSSELL.

No. 28.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 146.)

My Lord,

Therapia, May 3, 1841.

DURING a visit made me by M. de Titow this morning I received from Baron de Stürmer a despatch from Prince Metternich, dated 19th April. M. de Titow had been made acquainted with it by the Internuncio, and therefore I was at liberty to read it with him. My opinion was freely given in reply to his demand,—it was, that in furtherance of the views exposed in the despatch, and in your Lordship's instruction 10th April, it would be expedient that the Sublime Porte should send to Alexandria

the firman containing the concessions the Sultan had made upon the three points: succession, tribute, and military rank; and that a letter should be written by the Grand Vizier, in reply to that received from Mehemet Ali, couched in terms of great civility, and recapitulating the demands made by Mehemet Ali in connection with the conditions *seriatim*, and stating with reference to each, briefly, such reasons as the Sublime Porte might think fit to give why those demands cannot be complied with, and accompanied with the observation on each case, that the demand was in contradiction to the advice given to the Sublime Porte by the Four Powers, the august Allies of the Sultan. By this, a motive which is supposed to have influenced Mehemet Ali would be counteracted (if it existed), namely, the belief that the Four Powers had withdrawn, or would withdraw, themselves from the question between the Sublime Porte and Mehemet Ali, and also the dignity of the Sultan would be preserved by the declared action of the Four Powers, his Allies, as his advisers.

With relation to the return of the Consuls, which Prince Metternich now desires to defer till after Mehemet Ali shall have proved his submission by conforming to the settlement that may be made between him and the Porte, I said I had always thought the Protocol ordering their return had been made by the Conference in ignorance of the exact state of affairs, and that the return of the Consuls was inexpedient, but that I had yielded to the opinion of my colleagues, who had, in support of it, the letter of that Protocol: I therefore could now only be glad that the Consuls were still here, and that it was not too late to act in conformity with the present views entertained of expediency.

I have taken care to make Rifaat fully acquainted with your Lordship's opinion upon the various propositions or demands made by Mehemet Ali for the annulment or the modification of the conditions attached by the Sultan, in the firman, to the grant of the hereditary government of Egypt to the family of Mehemet Ali; and I have reason to hope and to believe, that what your Lordship has stated on those points is likely to be the rule by which the Sublime Porte will guide itself in any answer that may be made by the Grand Vizier to the letter of Mehemet Ali. I am afraid Mehemet Ali is more likely to continue to resist than to submit, even so as to give a show that the agitation of this question is terminated; and I feel convinced he will never carry into execution any of the conditions, the effect of which is intended to be the reduction of his power. I do not believe Mehemet Ali possesses sound political sagacity, or that he will finally escape ruin brought upon him by his cunning and the foolish advice to which he has listened.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 29.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 148.)

My Lord,

Therapia, April 28, 1841.

I MADE known to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the opinions your Lordship has expressed upon the various matter and points in the letter of Mehemet Ali to the Grand Vizier. I have heard in reply from Rifaat Pasha, that he will immediately forward to Alexandria the instructions already drawn up for the Ottoman Agent there, and of which a copy was transmitted by me to your Lordship.

It is also intended by his Excellency to fix the tribute at 100,000 purses, but that is not as yet determined upon.

Rifaat says, "Count Nesselrode and Prince Metternich put the knife to our throats. They cause us to be told that all Europe consider the affair as terminated on the part of the Allies, and that we take upon ourselves a great responsibility for every day that we allow to pass over

before we send the firman; the three Representatives importune us in a way beyond all expression, and they insist that their Consuls return without a moment's delay to Alexandria with the firman. We have made known to the world what we grant by our Memorandum of the 19th April, and that appears to be in conformity with what we have heard from the British Ambassador."

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 30.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 149.)

My Lord,

Therapia, April 28, 1841.

THE Ministers of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, have desired that the Consuls of the Four Powers should be sent to Alexandria, and the Sublime Porte has consented; I have, therefore, requested Colonel Hodges to hold himself in readiness to accompany his colleagues to Egypt whenever they may be dispatched from hence.

I am well aware that the instructions relative to the return of the Consuls to Alexandria, were given before the Conference was in possession of the most material facts which form the case of this country, but I do not think myself authorised to interfere with a measure sanctioned by your Lordship.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 31.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 150.)

My Lord,

Therapia, May 5, 1841.

I HAVE reported to your Lordship the substance of my conversation on the 3rd with M. de Titow, and that he had undertaken to repeat to the Internuncio what had passed. I have this evening received from the latter his reply to my communication, as follows:—"Monsieur de Titow a eu l'obligeance de me faire part de l'entretien qu'il a eu avec vous relativement au langage que nous devons tenir à la Sublime Porte, ainsi que du plan que vous proposez à cet égard, et qui consiste:—

1°. A hâter l'expédition du nouveau firman à envoyer à Méhémet Ali.

2°. A veiller à ce que les trois modifications qui nous ont été annoncées dans un Mémoire de la Porte* comme ayant obtenu la sanction du Sultan, y soient insérées.

3°. A conseiller à la Sublime Porte de faire connaître à Méhémet Ali par une lettre Visirienne les motifs qui l'empêchent d'adhérer aux autres changemens qu'il sollicite†, motifs qui découlent de l'Acte Séparé de la Convention du 15 Juillet‡.

4°. A lui annoncer que les Consuls ne retourneront à leurs postes que lorsque la soumission de Méhémet Ali pourra être considérée comme complétée. Je n'hésite pas de souscrire point par point à ce plan, et vais dès demain y conformer mon langage envers Rifaat Pacha."

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

* Le Mémoire de la Porte est du 19 Avril.

† I said "those alterations which the Porte would refuse to make."

‡ I added, "and from the Collective Note of 30 January, and Memorandum of 13 March."

No. 32.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 85.)

My Lord,

Vienna, May 3, 1841.

IN my despatch No. 79, I stated Prince Metternich's opinions as to the moment at which France ought to convert her paraph into a signature. Having obtained a copy of the Prince's despatch upon the subject to Prince Esterhazy, I have the honour to inclose it to your Lordship.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

Inclosure in No. 32.

Prince Metternich to Prince Esterhazy.

Mon Prince,

Vienne, le 23 Avril, 1841.

LA poste ordinaire de Constantinople m'a apporté les rapports ci-joints de l'Internonce. Ils me donnent l'espoir que la Porte aura adopté les conseils de ses alliés, dès que ceux-ci lui auront été présentés par les Représentans des Quatre Cours. Le 7 Avril, Lord Ponsonby ne s'était pas encore expliqué envers ses collègues; mais comme la veille il avait envoyé à Londres un courrier, par lequel il annonçait à sa Cour qu'il agirait en conformité de ses instructions, je tire de cette disposition un augure favorable à l'entente entre le Divan et les Puissances.

Je vous envoie également ci-joint deux directions que j'ai adressées à l'Internonce le 19 et le 20 Avril; elles suffisent pour vous faire connaître exactement notre manière de juger la position.

J'ai reçu le 20, les rapports de Votre Altesse du 10, ainsi qu'une expédition de M. le Comte Appony du 12 de ce mois. Comme cet Ambassadeur n'aura pas manqué de vous instruire directement, mon Prince, des explications qui ont eu lieu entre lui et M. Guizot au sujet de la signature de l'Acte paraphé, il ne me reste qu'à vous faire connaître notre jugement sur l'opportunité de la signature Française.

Nous, pour notre part, ne sommes en aucune manière pressés de voir apposer cette signature à un Acte à la teneur duquel le Cabinet Français est déjà lié par sa paraph. Nous trouverions même plus d'inconvénient que d'avantage à ce que la Convention fût signée avant que l'accord entre les Quatre Cours et la Porte ne soit définitivement établi, et cela par la raison que, si l'établissement de cet accord a jusqu'à cette heure rencontré des difficultés entre les Quatre Cours et le Divan, l'adjonction d'une cinquième Cour, au lieu de faciliter la tâche, ne pourrait que la rendre plus difficile.

Aussi, pénétrés, comme nous le sommes, de cette conviction, ne nous avez-vous jamais vus presser la signature du Cabinet Français, mais bien la fin du différend Turco-Egyptien. Il est évident que la signature de la Convention relative à la clôture des détroits n'a rien qui soit en rapport direct avec l'affaire Turco-Egyptienne. Je vous prie, mon Prince, ainsi que M. le Baron de Neumann, de ne point vous tromper à cet égard. Il s'agit ici de deux affaires distinctes de leur nature, et qui n'ont ensemble d'autre connexité que celle du point d'arrivée où elles se rencontreront tout naturellement. Confondre ces affaires ce serait ouvrir la porte à plus d'un danger, et notre habitude n'est pas d'en créer à plaisir.

Ce qui est vraiment important, ce vers quoi ont dès lors tendu nos constans efforts, c'est que l'affaire Turco-Egyptienne soit conduite à sa fin dans les termes de la Convention du 15 Juillet. Nous désirons ceci, parce qu'il entre dans notre marche habituelle de vider les affaires dans lesquelles nous sommes engagés, convaincus que, quand le terme d'une affaire n'est pas clairement marqué, il en naît forcément des affaires nouvelles et qui sont placées en dehors de tout calcul possible. Afin que nos

Plénipotentiaires à Londres puissent saisir toute notre pensée à l'égard de ce que nous croyons désirable dans la présente position des choses, je vais résumer cette pensée dans les points suivans, que je m'appliquerai à bien préciser.

1°. Nous reconnaissons l'existence de deux affaires distinctes de leur nature, mais se confondant dans leurs points d'arrivée.

L'une de ces affaires, c'est le résidu encore existant de la Question Turco-Egyptienne. Elle est placée entre les Quatre Cours et la Porte, et ses limites sont tracées par les Actes des 15 Juillet, des 14 Novembre et 17 Décembre 1840, par la Note Collective du 30 Janvier, et les Arrêtés du 5 Mars, 1841. L'autre affaire, c'est la signature de la Convention relative à la clôture des détroits, qui doit s'effectuer entre les Cinq Cours et le Divan.

2°. Les deux affaires ne doivent point être confondues l'une avec l'autre, attendu qu'elles diffèrent dans leur essence. Vu son isolement volontaire du Traité du 15 Juillet et de ses conséquences immédiates, le Gouvernement Français n'a point à intervenir dans l'Affaire Turco-Egyptienne proprement dite. Lui-même n'en a pas le désir, et s'il en était autrement, nous y verrions un grave inconvénient. La répugnance du Cabinet Français ne repose pas, dans la présente occasion, sur un calcul politique actif; elle provient du sentiment, qu'en entrant dans l'affaire aujourd'hui, il s'engagerait dans une position insoutenable pour l'administration actuelle, vu l'immense somme de folies dont s'est rendu coupable le Cabinet du 1 Mars. Le Cabinet actuel est sage, en un mot, parce qu'il lui serait impossible de ne pas l'être, et cette position gênée tournera, à notre avis, à l'avantage des Quatre Cours et de la Porte, si elles savent conduire à bon terme l'entreprise du 15 Juillet; mais cette même position ne pourra que tourner à leur désavantage, si elles ne savent point atteindre le but qu'elles se sont proposé à la face de l'Europe, et au soutien duquel elles ont voué des efforts couronnés de si éclatans succès matériels!

3°. Le concours de la France dans l'affaire des détroits n'a, par lui-même, guère d'autre valeur que celle d'un complément de la grande œuvre du 15 Juillet. Ce concours présente toutefois le seul mode pour délivrer la France (à son profit comme à celui de l'Europe) de son isolement absurde,—je dis absurde, parce qu'il tient la France écartée de l'intérêt général dont aucune Grande Puissance ne saurait s'isoler impunément. La paix armée, ce dernier produit d'une folle conception, conséquence forcée de ce que la faction de M. Thiers s'est plu à appeler l'isolement, étant insoutenable et pour la France et pour les autres Puissances, surtout pour celles qui sont limitrophes de la France—il faudra bien qu'elle vienne à cesser. Pour cela il faut un prétexte, et ce prétexte se trouvera dans l'adjonction du Gouvernement Français à une mesure de saine politique. Telle étant la vérité à l'égard de la signature de la Convention relative à la clôture des détroits, qu'y a-t-il de commun entre cette affaire et le règlement définitif des attitudes respectives du Sultan et du Pacha d'Egypte? Il est clair que la connexité entre les deux questions ne peut s'établir qu'à l'issue de l'Affaire Turco-Egyptienne. C'est donc cette affaire qu'il faut finir avant de passer à la signature avec la France. Marcher différemment ce serait créer un embarras, dont le moindre inconvénient ne serait pas celui d'enchevêtrer les positions de manière à ce que personne ne trouverait plus moyen de se reconnaître; l'honneur des Quatre Cours serait, à notre avis, compromis, parce qu'alors elles auraient l'air de ne point avoir pu conduire à terme une entreprise dont elles se sont chargées à la face de l'Europe, et de n'y être parvenues qu'au moyen du concours de la France. Ce serait un bill d'indemnité accordé aux extravagances du Cabinet du 1 Mars, et qui serait pour lui d'une bien autre valeur que celui qu'il vient d'obtenir au moyen de l'admission des fortifications de Paris,—folie qui complète un système, désavoué journellement davantage par la raison publique du pays même sur lequel elle pèsera de tout son poids.

4°. Après avoir ainsi séparé d'une manière distincte les objets en instance, et les avoir classés selon leur ordre naturel, nous assignons la première place dans l'action des Quatre Cours, à la terminaison de l'Affaire Turco-Egyptienne, et la seconde à la signature de la Convention entre les

Cinq Cours d'une part et la Porte de l'autre part. Ce qu'on fera pour hâter la conclusion de la première de ces affaires servira aussi à rapprocher celle de la seconde. Renverser cet ordre logique des choses, ce serait commettre une faute et s'exposer à toutes les conséquences qu'elle entraînerait.

Il me reste encore à exposer ici notre sentiment sur le moment le plus opportun pour provoquer la signature de la France, et voici ce que nous pensons à cet égard :

Les Quatre Cours viennent de faire une démarche serrée à Constantinople, pour engager le Divan à prescrire à Méhémet Ali des conditions que les Quatre Cours jugent les plus rationnelles, et cela dans l'intérêt même de la Porte, comme aussi parce que ces conditions sont les plus conformes aux stipulations du 15 Juillet. La Porte devra prendre un parti à l'égard des plus récentes manifestations des Puissances ses alliées; et ce parti sera—je le regarde comme certain—conforme à leurs vœux.

Quand la réponse affirmative du Divan sera arrivée à la connaissance des Cours, alors elles feront bien d'insister, sans attendre la réponse du Pacha d'Egypte, sur la signature de l'Acte relatif à la clôture des détroits. Nous fondons ce sentiment sur le principe, que les Quatre Cours n'ont d'arrangemens à prendre qu'avec la Porte et non avec Méhémet Ali, lequel n'a, à leurs yeux, d'autre existence que celle d'un sujet du Sultan. Le jour donc où les parties principales se seront définitivement entendues entre elles, l'affaire sera arrivée à sa fin. Si Méhémet Ali devait ne pas obéir à son Souverain, ce serait alors lui qui commencerait une affaire nouvelle, et cette affaire pourrait être traitée, comme toutes les affaires, sous l'égide de la liberté du mouvement des Cours. Quant à la ligne de pensées et de conduite que la nôtre suivrait dans cette hypothèse, je n'ai pas besoin de vous la développer. Elle sera conforme aux principes qui servent invariablement de guide à notre politique; ces principes, dont les deux dernières années ont offert de nouvelles preuves, ne peuvent être mis en doute nulle part.

Recevez, &c.,
(Signé) METTERNICH.

No. 33.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 87.)

(Extract.)

Vienna, May 3, 1841.

HAVING communicated confidentially to Prince Metternich Mr. Bulwer's No. 11 to your Lordship, I have received in reply a private letter from the Prince, of which I inclose an extract to your Lordship.

Mr. Bulwer's report serves the Prince as a text from which to advocate the thesis that the moment for France to sign the Convention will have arrived as soon as the Sultan shall have complied with the demand of the Four Powers relative to the conditions to be accorded by His Highness to Mehemet Ali. As this was in its origin a suggestion of my own to the Prince, I cannot but agree with him upon it; and the reasonings by which he supports it appear to me to be conclusive upon the question.

Inclosure in No. 33.

Prince Metternich to Lord Beauvale.

(Extract.)

(Particulière.)

Le 2 Mai, 1841.

QUANT au rapport de M. Bulwer, je trouve que les deux interlocuteurs, M. Bulwer et M. Guizot, ont eu raison dans ce qu'ils se sont dit. Le terme moyen pour l'entente est celui que j'ai proposé à Londres et à Paris. Il faut finir l'affaire encore pendante entre les Quatre Cours et le Sultan, et puis passer immédiatement à la signature de la Convention avec la

France. Alors il n'y aura plus un inconvénient d'attaché à cette signature, et il y en aurait eu pour les Quatre Cours et pour la Porte si la signature avait précédé l'arrangement entre ces Cours et le Divan, et cela par la double raison que cet arrangement aurait pu devenir impossible par l'intervention de la France, (et son intervention n'était plus à recuser,) et que la jactance habituelle de cette Puissance n'eût point manqué de se faire jour au moyen de la prétention que ce serait à son secours que serait due l'entente définitive entre la Porte et ses Alliés. Le danger a été évité parce que les Ministres Français ne pourraient, s'ils le voulaient même, point entrer dans l'affaire aussi longtemps qu'elle sera encore ouverte. Dans la circonstance présente la force des choses intervient ainsi utilement, ce qui n'est pas toujours le cas !

Le jour où les Quatre Cours et le Divan seront entendus, il faudra que Méhémet Ali ploye, à moins qu'il n'entende passer immédiatement à un acte de rébellion nouveau. Je ne crois pas qu'il le veuille, mais en supposant même qu'il en fût autrement, encore vaudrait-il mieux avoir tiré une ligne claire et patente entre la dernière et la nouvelle affaire. Rien d'après mon sentiment n'est pire qu'une affaire dont le point de départ n'est pas clairement défini, et pour qu'il puisse l'être il faut qu'il soit définissable, ce qui n'est que difficilement le cas quand un différend se fonde dans un autre différend. Telle est ma pensée relativement à cet objet important et je n'en ai pas une autre.

No. 34.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 90.)

My Lord,

Vienna, May 3, 1841.

WITH reference to Lord W. Russell's No 18 to your Lordship, wherein he represents Baron Werther to have told him that the Prussian Government looked upon the Treaty of July as terminated, and would take no further part in the negotiations, I have reason to know that the real intention of the Prussian Government is to place itself upon the same ground as that of Austria. This ground is to regard itself as released from the obligation to take part in coercive measures arising out of the Treaty of July, but not to separate itself from negotiations tending to wind up the affair. I have reason to think that Prince Metternich had not sufficiently explained this distinction in his first explanations upon the subject. If he had done so, Baron Werther would probably have observed, that Austria thereby only places herself upon the same ground which Prussia has occupied from the beginning.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 35.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 26.)

(Separate.)

My Lord,

Vienna, May 3, 1841.

BOGHOS BEY has addressed a letter to Marshal Marmont, expressing a wish on the part of Mehemet Ali to be made acquainted with the opinions of Prince Metternich upon his (the Pasha's) position.

This letter having been shown to the Prince, he has written one to the Marshal containing the required exposition of them, and has furnished me with a copy of it for communication to your Lordship. This I have the honour to inclose.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) BEAUVALE.

Inclosure in No. 35.

Prince Metternich to Marshal Marmont.

Mon cher Maréchal,

Vienne, le 27 Avril, 1841.

JE vous remercie de la lecture que vous m'avez permis de prendre de la lettre de Boghos Bey. Je vous dirai franchement ce que j'en pense.

L'année dernière a porté de grandes leçons à Méhémet Ali, et elles devraient lui marquer la ligne qu'il doit suivre. Il paraît qu'il n'en a pas encore tiré ce profit, car la lettre de Boghos Jussouf est entachée d'idées politiques, et c'est tout juste la politique qui est l'élément que doit fuir Méhémet Ali. L'Europe veut une Egypte province de l'Empire Ottoman, et non une Egypte formant, sous le masque de la soumission, un Etat indépendant et agissant comme un dissolvant sur cet Empire. La clé de l'énigme est là et la chercher autre part c'est se tromper. Ce que Méhémet Ali a désiré il l'a obtenu. L'hérédité dans le Pachalic a été accordée à sa famille. Ce que certaines conditions du firman d'investiture ont renfermé de peu pratique sera réformé, car la Porte est intéressée à ce que des embarras ne surgissent à toute heure entre elle et les Pachas d'Egypte. Les Puissances de l'Europe ont le même intérêt, et le sens commun me dit qu'il est également celui de la famille de Méhémet Ali. La question n'est pas dans tel ou tel détail, mais elle se trouve dans l'ensemble de la position. Si Méhémet Ali veut ce qu'admet la Porte et ce qu'avec elle ont admis les Puissances, s'il veut que sa famille soit investie de l'hérédité dans le gouvernement d'une province Ottomane, il peut se dire qu'il a atteint son but. S'il veut une situation indépendante, s'il vise à établir la souveraineté dans sa famille, alors il se trouve en opposition non seulement avec la Porte, mais avec l'Europe entière, et lui et sa succession périront dans l'entreprise.

Voilà ce que je pense de la position, et ce que j'en pense est assis sur de la très-saine pratique.

Mille sincères hommages.

(Signé) METTERNICH.

No. 36.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 26.)

(Secret.)

My Lord,

Vienna, May 3, 1841.

ALONG with Prince Metternich's despatch of the 23rd of April, to Prince Esterhazy, there was sent a secret one evidently destined to establish the Austrian case in the conduct of the Turco-Egyptian affair. Having succeeded in obtaining a copy of this document, I have the honour to transmit it to your Lordship.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) BEAUVALE.

Inclosure in No. 36.

Prince Metternich to Prince Esterhazy.

(Secrète.)

Mon Prince,

Vienne, le 23 Avril, 1841.

LA tâche que remplit le centre de Londres éprouve le sort réservé à toute affaire complexe qui traîne en longueur; il devient très-difficile de se faire comprendre à distance. En lisant la dépêche précédente vous aurez eu lieu de vous convaincre que dans ce centre on se trompe si on

croit que nous cherchons à hâter la signature de l'Acte paraphé. Notre insistance ne porte que sur la fin de l'Affaire Turco-Egyptienne, et sur ce point il me reste une remarque à vous faire.

Ne croyez pas que nous ne sachions pas faire une différence entre la fin formelle et celle effective de cette affaire. La première tient à ce qui reste à régler entre les Quatre Cours et la Porte; la seconde se compose de ce qui a trait à ce que je me permettrai de nommer la vie journalière entre le Sultan et Méhémet Ali. La fin de l'affaire, en tant qu'elle concerne les Quatre Cours et la Porte, sera atteinte dès que la Porte aura consenti au changement réclamé par ces Cours, relativement à la fixation du mode rationnel de succession dans le Pachalic d'Egypte; ce que j'entends par la vie entre le Sultan et Méhémet Ali s'arrangera sans doute d'une manière ou d'une autre d'ici à l'époque du décès de ce dernier, mais ces arrangements ne pourront jamais conduire à des relations satisfaisantes entre les deux parties; car la nature des positions le veut ainsi, et personne ne peut forcer celle des choses.

Le règlement du conflit Egyptien a de tout temps été influencé par un jeu dont l'origine était en partie dans les vues de politique isolée de quelques Cabinets, et en partie dans la marche confuse de la pensée de certains individus. Cette confusion d'idées provenait surtout de ce qu'on ne se soit pas rendu un compte rationnel et exact de ce qu'est l'affaire. Notre Cabinet n'y a jamais vu autre chose qu'un secours à prêter au Trône du Sultan contre le danger flagrant d'un renversement qui se trouvait au bout des entreprises de Méhémet Ali. Ce n'est pas à la restauration de ce trône que nous avons attaché notre pensée et nos efforts. Aussi croirons-nous avoir rempli notre tâche, lorsque Méhémet Ali refoulé en Egypte se sera soumis à son Souverain. Lord Ponsonby voulait la destruction du rebelle, et nous n'aurions certes rien eu à objecter contre un pareil résultat; mais nous avons cru de tout temps que cet heureux événement ne pouvait être amené que par des coups de fortune; et d'après notre intime conviction, les moyens matériels employés à la libération de la Syrie n'ont jamais présenté la force qui eût été nécessaire pour fonder sur elle le plan de la destruction du rebelle en Egypte. Il est vrai que dans le cours de l'expédition de Syrie des chances d'opérer cette destruction se sont présentées, savoir, immédiatement après la première affaire dans le Liban, puis après la chute de St. Jean d'Acre. Ces occasions une fois perdues, et elles l'ont été par la faute du Général Smith et par l'indécision de l'Amiral Stopford, elles ne se sont plus renouvelées; il n'y a que l'imagination ardente de Lord Ponsonby et la pensée du Principal Secrétaire d'Etat, influencée par l'action de cet Ambassadeur, qui ait rêvé la possibilité de ces chances.

Le plan de Lord Ponsonby n'a jamais cessé d'être celui de la destruction totale de Méhémet Ali. Celui des Quatre Cours est resté circonscrit dans des limites bien plus étroites, et les opérations maritimes ont été calculées sur ce plan plus restreint. Qui veut une chose doit en vouloir les moyens, et pouvoir disposer des moyens. Or, cette faculté Lord Ponsonby ne l'a pas eue; il s'est donc livré à l'entreprise espérant que cette voie le ferait arriver à ses fins. Il a manqué son coup, mais il a fait sortir l'affaire elle-même des voies qu'elle aurait dû suivre. Apercevant cette déviation, nous avons élevé notre voix, non dans l'intérêt isolé Autrichien, mais dans celui des Puissances engagées avec nous dans une même entreprise. Ce qui surtout est demeuré étranger à nos calculs c'est la pensée de favoriser la France, et néanmoins Lord Palmerston dans des momens d'humeur n'a point hésité de nous adresser ce reproche. C'est de l'irritation hors de propos; notre unique souci étant de voir le vaisseau sur lequel nous sommes embarqués arriver au port, nous ne nous y arrêtons pas. En revanche, nous attachons le plus grand prix à ce que nos Plénipotentiaires se rendent forts de notre bon droit et de notre raison, et c'est pour qu'il en soit ainsi que je suis entré dans des détails que justifient les actes et ma volumineuse correspondance durant les deux années de tracasserie politique qui vont s'écouler.

Si vous vous pénétrez de ces vérités, mon Prince, vous ne serez en doute ni sur ce que nous cherchons ni sur ce que nous ne voulons pas. Nous cherchons à amener le plus tôt possible la fin de l'affaire conformé-

ment aux bases de la Convention du 15 Juillet, 1840. Ce que nous ne voulons pas c'est toute chose qui fausserait cette base pour lui en substituer une que nous ne connaissons pas, dont personne ne nous a divulgué le secret, et qui ne saurait être qu'une base de pure fantaisie. Nous ne nous attendons point à une cure radicale des immenses embarras qui pèsent sur la Porte Ottomane; et nous ne sommes que trop persuadés que ces embarras continueront à peser sur elle, quoi que puissent faire les Puissances. Tout ce que nous nous proposons, c'est de tirer une ligne entre ce qui appartient au Traité du 15 Juillet, 1840, et ce qui ne lui appartient pas. Cette ligne une fois tirée on pourra se reconnaître et aviser aux besoins qu'amènera le jour qui court. Dégagés de ceux de la veille, nous nous sentirons plus forts, ne fût-ce que parceque nous serons plus libres de notre action. Là se trouve le secret de notre conduite,—un secret que nous sommes d'ailleurs prêts à publier en tous lieux et que nous prenons à tâche de ne laisser ignorer de personne. Veuillez, mon Prince, vous pénétrer de ces vérités et vous les proposer comme autant de guides assurés pour régler votre propre marche.

Recevez, &c.,
(Signé) METTERNICH.

No. 37.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 98.)

My Lord,

Vienna, May 19, 1841.

PRINCE Metternich highly approves of the answer to Chekib Effendi, as well as of the instruction to Lord Ponsonby, of the 11th of May; and he sends orders to Baron Stürmer, by the present occasion, to conform his conduct thereto.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 38.

Lord Beauvale to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 102.)

My Lord,

Vienna, May 19, 1841.

PRINCE Metternich has shown me a despatch which he has prepared for communication to the Courts of London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, and to that of Paris, when France shall have converted her paraph into a signature.

It contains his views as to the course to be pursued by the European Courts for the preservation of the Ottoman Empire, and invites the communication of theirs.

The counsels which the Prince proposes to give to the Porte, wise in themselves, are perhaps open to the reproach he applies to the Turkish attempt at imitating the Western Powers, of being inapplicable to the country they are applied to. In making this remark to him, I expressed a doubt whether the Powers would not do well to give fewer counsels to the Porte as to its internal administration, rather than to increase their number. He said that there was no doubt they would, but that the attainment of this was hopeless, and that, therefore, the next best thing would be to try and give a character of uniformity to their advice.

The Prince's real objects do not appear upon the face of this despatch. He does not dare bring them openly forwards, but puts this forth as a feeler to try if they can be approached. They are two. The first is to obtain a renewal of the engagements taken by England, France, Austria,

and Prussia, in no case to accept of any aggrandizement at the expense of the Turkish Empire, and to complete these acts by the accession of Russia to them. The second is to establish at Vienna a central point from which instructions should be sent in common to the Ambassadors of the Five Powers at Constantinople, so as to ensure the uniformity of their language and conduct.

I do not hesitate to state my opinion that both these objects, if they could be attained, would be eminently calculated to conduce to the repose of the Ottoman Empire and to the peace of Europe. Prince Metternich's position with the Emperor of Russia does not enable him to bring them avowedly forwards, but your Lordship will observe that in his despatch to Prince Esterhazy, he opens the door for other Powers, by volunteering on the part of Austria the disclaimer which he wishes them to adopt.

Should Her Majesty's Government approve the Prince's views upon these two points, and be disposed to take the initiative with other Powers in forwarding them, it may be certain of acting therein in conformity with the wishes of Austria, but I cannot apprehend with any great chance of success. When the Prince first spoke to me upon the subject, some weeks back, he answered for the assent of Russia to the self-denying declaration, thereby falling anew into his fault of 1839. He has since grown more cautious in his language, and would be glad to see Her Majesty's Government take the lead.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) BEAUVALE.

No. 39.

The Marquess of Clanricarde to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 51.)

(Extract.)

St. Petersburg, May 14, 1841.

YESTERDAY I had audiences to take leave of their Imperial Majesties, and of other Members of the Imperial Family.

With the Emperor I had the honour of a long conversation, during the whole course of which, His Imperial Majesty evinced the same good will and cordiality towards Her Majesty's Government that it has been my duty to report to your Lordship on former occasions. The Emperor supposed the possible case, that Mehemet Ali, having now his army concentrated, and having had time to make preparations for defence at least against the Sultan, should obstinately refuse to accede to the terms the Allies had judged fair; and wished to know what England was prepared to do in such a contingency? I said His Majesty might rely upon it, the Queen's Government would not hesitate to execute fully the engagements entered into by the Treaty of July, and by the communications of the Conference of London with the Porte.

The Emperor said he had no doubt of it, or of our firmness; but that he thought it might be as well if the determination were announced or recorded.

I mentioned the policy of France, at this moment, to unite herself to Prussia and to Austria. The Emperor said there was no harm or danger in that. That Prussia knew her own interest and her best policy too well, not to desire to be upon good terms with France, but nothing more; that he knew the King of Prussia was too well aware of the character of the French Government and of the French people to trust to them, or to join himself in close alliance with them. But, the Emperor said, he spoke of the present Prussian Government,—of Prussia such as she still was, notwithstanding the follies that had been committed,—but that, what might happen in Prussia, or what that country might become, was quite a different matter, although he had now reason to hope that things would go on better than he had apprehended. That as to Austria,

Prince Metternich always had pursued and would pursue the same vacillating course, expressing great alarm whenever Russia and England did not appear to be on terms of cordiality; and leaning towards France, and appearing to withdraw from them, when their friendship assured him that peace was secure.

After renewing the expression of His Majesty's personal sentiments towards the Queen, and of his friendly feelings towards England, the Emperor dismissed me in the most kind and flattering manner.

No. 40.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received May 30.)

(No. 66.)

My Lord,

Paris, May 28, 1841.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatches to No. 56, inclusive.

M. Guizot read to me this morning a despatch from M. de Bourqueney, in which that gentleman stated, that he had informed your Lordship that his Government would be now ready to give him the powers for signing the Convention of March, on your Lordship's affirming to him that you considered the Treaty of July was abrogated by the Porte's recent Memorandum; and that your Lordship had thereupon, with great frankness, replied, "that you deemed yourself under such circumstances bound to say to M. de Bourqueney, that though you confidently expected that the firman founded upon the memorandum alluded to would be accepted by Mehemet Ali, and, consequently, that the Treaty in question would thus be at an end, you would not take upon yourself, without having received Mehemet's answer, to say that it was so."—"Under which circumstances," said M. de Bourqueney, "I could only observe, in compliance with all my instructions, that until the Alliance created by the Treaty of July was dissolved, France could not be a party to the Convention of March, which, in fact, was intended to be a document signed by the Five Powers, in order to show that the Four Powers were no longer acting by themselves."

"I have no remark to make on this," said M. Guizot, "for my own part, except to thank Lord Palmerston for the frankness and loyalty of his communication; but I wish you to observe that it is not I who now refuse to sign the Additional Treaty on the plea that Mehemet Ali may not consent to the firman (the conditions contained in which I consider reasonable); the objection and the delay proceed from the Government of Great Britain. I hope that this will not encourage Mehemet Ali, or lead him to think, that by refusing the terms proposed to him he may create dissensions amongst the European Powers, and great care must be taken that this is not the case."

"As for myself, I shall write this day to M. de Chabot, telling him what has occurred for his own information, but warning him that he is not to communicate it to Mehemet Ali, but to tell him simply that France urges him in the strongest manner to accept the Sultan's propositions, and cannot afford him any protection or support of any kind, if he does not."

I observed to M. Guizot, after stating how much I was satisfied by his last-mentioned communication, that though some risk might possibly arise from the Viceroy's imagining that the Five Powers were not agreed as to the firman, their names not immediately appearing to the document which was to be the signal of their union, that I could yet see another difficulty in the opposite case: for, supposing that Mehemet were told that the Alliance of July was broken up, at the same time that the Sultan's offers were made to him, might he not say to himself, (if these offers were disagreeable to him,) "all power of compelling me to be reasonable is at an end?" and might he not, consequently, refuse these

offers; and what then was to occur? No one could say that the objects contemplated by the Treaty of July were attained, and yet the Treaty of July would be over.

M. Guizot admitted the truth of this, and said that there were undoubtedly difficulties both ways; and that, for his own part, he was in no hurry about the matter, but was only anxious to have it clearly understood, that he had fulfilled his pledge when he said that whenever France thought that the terms offered to the Pasha were just and reasonable, she should never wait for his consent or opinion in order to declare them so. I then asked M. Guizot whether he feared that any difficulty would arise on the part of Mehemet Ali as to the application of the general laws of the Ottoman Empire to Egypt, and he said, "No;" that "the only difficulty he foresaw regarded the tribute; that he had always hitherto understood that this was to be left as a matter to be debated between the Sultan and his vassal, but that he now heard that the firman was to contain a specified sum; and he feared that if this sum were extravagant, the Pasha would not consent to pay it."

I should say, since I am writing on this subject, that since seeing M. Guizot I have had some conversation with Count Appony, who appeared very much disconcerted at the contents of M. de Bourqueney's despatch, and the delay in the signature of the Additional Convention which it announces.

He went, indeed, so far as to say, that "he thought his Government would very probably declare, from this moment, that it considered the question terminated, and would take no part beyond that of giving the Sultan its moral support in any further measures against the Pasha of Egypt, whatever might be the Pasha's conduct as to the present firman." I repeated to him the argument I had used to M. Guizot, and pointed out the difficulty of declaring the Treaty of July to be over until the state of things it had intended to establish was consented to by the Two Parties; but he seemed to think that we should have got France, at all events, to sign the new Treaty; and that she would then have been bound to compel the Pasha, in conjunction with ourselves, to accept the conditions which, by the very signature of the said Treaty, she would have pronounced reasonable. I said, "Why then does not M. Guizot declare that the Treaty of July, being at an end, he would be ready to enter into a new treaty, should circumstances render it necessary, for the purpose you describe?" To this Count Appony gave no satisfactory answer; but I have mentioned our conversation, since your Lordship will be able to decide whether the opinions which the Count expressed may be considered evidence of the policy of his Cabinet, or of merely his own personal feelings.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 41.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.

(No. 108.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, June 2, 1841.

I HAVE received your Excellency's separate despatch of the 3rd ultimo, and copy of the very excellent letter which Prince Metternich has addressed to Marshal Marmont on the position of Mehemet Ali. That letter describes accurately, logically, and in a few words, the real position of Mehemet Ali, and cannot fail to have a powerful effect on his conduct.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 42.

Viscount Palmerston to Lord Beauvale.

(No. 110, Confidential.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, June 2, 1841.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch, No. 102, of the 19th ultimo, reporting the communication which it is the intention of Prince Metternich to make to the Courts of London, Paris, Berlin, and St. Petersburg, whenever France shall have signed the Convention initialed on the 15th of March, I have to state to your Excellency, that it would seem to be a mistake to attempt to engage the Five Powers in a general self-denying engagement such as Prince Metternich contemplates, because it is quite certain that Russia would not be a party to it; and if the proposal were made to her and refused by her, she would evidently stand upon better ground, and be more free for future action than if no such proposal had been made to her. That she would refuse is certain, and she would have plausible reasons to assign for so doing. She would say, that the other Four Powers cannot guarantee her against any such offence or injury on the part of Turkey as would justify war, or even render war on her part necessary. That if one Power is compelled by aggression or injury to go to war with another, a war so begun may end in conquest, and conquest in the retention of some portion of territory; and that, consequently, Russia cannot bind herself in no case to acquire any portion of the Turkish territory, because Russia cannot be secure against injustice or aggression on the part of Turkey. It would appear, therefore, to be better that the Powers of Europe should rest satisfied with the principle laid down in the Protocol of September last, and should reserve to themselves to take such steps as their own interests might require, if any events should in future happen which threatened to lead to an appropriation by Russia of any part of the Turkish territory.

With regard to Prince Metternich's second proposal, that a central point of concert should be established at Vienna; from whence instructions should, from time to time, be sent to the Representatives of the Five Powers at Constantinople, that proposal is one which Her Majesty's Government would not be much disposed to agree to. For the course pursued during the last two years by Austria, in regard to the Turco-Egyptian Question, has not on the whole been so steady and consistent, nor marked with such invariable firmness and energy, as to inspire Her Majesty's Government with that degree of confidence in the policy of the Austrian Cabinet which an acquiescence in such a scheme would imply. And, in fact, when the temporary engagements of the Treaty of July shall have been fully worked out and fulfilled, perhaps the best thing will be, that the Five Powers and Turkey should fall back into their usual state of reciprocal relations.

Concert between Powers and centres of negotiation are useful and necessary when some treaty is in operation, which not only requires, but at the same time regulates their common action; but it would be very difficult to establish a permanent concert, unaccompanied by any recorded and specific engagement.

Therefore, if Prince Esterhazy should mention this matter to me, it is most probable that it would be my duty to decline, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, entering into the course proposed; but I shall say nothing to him on the subject until he speaks to me about it.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 43.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 4.)

(No. 160.)

My Lord,

Therapia, May 11, 1841.

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs has expressed his satisfaction with the plan proposed by the Representatives of the Four Powers for the con-

duct of the affairs with Mehemet Ali; but the firman and vizirial letter have not yet been communicated to me, and I believe are not yet fully prepared.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 44.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 4.)

(No. 162.)

My Lord,

Therapia, May 12, 1841.

I HAVE this day been informed by the dragoman, that he thinks Rifaat Pasha has the intention to delay the confidential communication to the Representatives of the new firman about Mehemet Ali, until the Porte shall have again heard from Chekib Effendi.

The dragoman says he has reminded Rifaat Pasha of the advice I gave the Sublime Porte to issue the firman without delay, &c.

I have this day instructed the dragoman to tell Rifaat Pasha, that if any delay take place in the above matter, I shall think it necessary to call upon my colleagues officially for their concurrence and support in making an inquiry at the Sublime Porte what may be the reasons of the delay of the firman, &c., in order that we may be enabled to acquaint our Governments with the cause assigned for it by the Sublime Porte.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 45.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 7.)

(No. 84.)

My Lord,

Paris, June 4, 1841.

M. GUIZOT having stated to me to-day in the course of conversation, that his fears were daily increasing as to the critical state of the Ottoman Empire, and that "he was taking his measures accordingly," I returned to that expression in a friendly way, in order to ask him the extent of its meaning. He assured me, that he meant nothing more thereby than to say, that he had ordered all French Agents in Greece and in Turkey, to show an increase of diligence in collecting and reporting every information they obtained as to the dangers menacing the Government of the Porte, so that every pains should be taken for foreseeing, and if possible, guarding against any of those eventualities which (he thinks) are to be dreaded.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 46.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 165.)

My Lord,

Therapia, May 17, 1841.

I HAVE received information from Mr. Chasseaud, the British Vice-Consul at Alexandria, that Mehemet Ali has given orders for building two new ships of the line.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 47.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 168.)

My Lord,

Therapia, May 22, 1841.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of my reply to Rifaat Pasha, when he first communicated to me the new firman and requested me to give my approbation of it in writing. Your Lordship will observe, that I confined myself to an approval of the three points,—Succession, Tribute, and Military Rank;—points upon which the Four Powers have spoken decidedly.

I inclose also copy of the answer made by the Internuncio on the same occasion.

I understand that the Russian and Prussian Ministers have sent similar answers, but I have not a copy.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 47.

Viscount Ponsonby to F. Pisani, Esq.

Sir,

Therapia, May 18, 1841.

YOU will thank his Excellency Rifaat Pasha for the communication of the *projet* for a new firman intended by the Sublime Porte to be addressed to the Pasha of Egypt, and you will tell him I am happy to see therein that the Sublime Porte has acceded to the wishes expressed by the August Allies of the Sultan, and has made the modifications in the regulations concerning the Succession, the Tribute, and Military Rank.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 47.

Baron de Stürmer to the Baron de Testa.

M. le Baron,

19 Mai, 1841.

J'AI lu avec la plus scrupuleuse attention le projet du nouveau firman que la Sublime Porte se propose d'adresser au Pacha d'Egypte et sur lequel Son Excellence M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères voudrait connaître mon opinion. Les modifications sur le règlement de la Succession, du Tribut, et des Avancemens Militaires, s'y trouvant insérées telles qu'elles avaient été proposées par les Cours Alliées, je ne doute pas qu'il ne soit accueilli par elles avec une bien vive satisfaction.

Quant aux autres points du firman, qui tous sont du ressort de l'administration intérieure de la Sublime Porte, il appartient à l'autorité de Sa Hautesse seule de les régler à son gré et de prendre en considération ou non les vœux que Méhémet Ali a soumis à ce sujet à sa décision.

Seulement je dois faire observer à la Sublime Porte, par ordre de ma Cour, qu'il est de sa dignité d'éviter qu'elle ne motive ce qu'elle accordera à Méhémet Ali comme une concession que Sa Hautesse ferait à la demande de ce Pacha, mais comme une marque de déférence aux conseils de ses Alliées.

Voilà ce que vous voudrez bien dire de ma part à Rifaat Pacha, en lui remettant, s'il le désire, une copie de la présente instruction.

J'ai l'honneur, &c.,
(Signé) STURMER.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 169.)

My Lord,

Therapia, May 22, 1841.

I HAVE to acquaint your Lordship that my Colleagues did not mean to approve of my plan which is reported in No. 146, and that the answers I received from them were not intended to express the meaning which they appeared to me to convey, but continued to be of opinion, that the Sublime Porte ought to answer Mehemet Ali's letter by a firman; I found that the Ottoman Ministers were of the same opinion, and I therefore determined to cease to press the adoption of my views at the Conference fixed for this day, and I acted accordingly.

The Conference met, composed of the Four Representatives, the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Seraskier, and Riza Pasha; the new firman was read, and some enquiries made to ascertain the sense of some passages; after which his Excellency Rifaat Pasha requested the Representatives to declare their approbation of the firman in writing.

The Representatives were of opinion that not being the authors of the firman, they ought not to assume so great a responsibility, but they consented to say in writing that they found nothing in it to object to, and a paper was signed by us all to that effect, a copy of which I inclose. I for one declined Rifaat Pasha's proposal, because I think the Article concerning the Hatti Sheriff of Gulhané does not secure the application of that law in Egypt, and also that the Article relating to the collection of taxes will, perhaps, leave Mehemet Ali free to continue his exactions upon the wretched Egyptians, and because the firman appears to me inadequate to the attainment of the ends clearly defined in your Lordship's instructions, and in the Acte Séparé, and the Collective Note, and the Protocol: but I objected to nothing, because the Sublime Porte is acknowledged to be the proper and only authority to determine the nature and extent of the restrictions to be imposed upon the powers of the Pasha of Egypt, and further, because I would not risk being subject to the charge of obstructing a settlement.

I think your Lordship will see in what has been done by the Porte a proof of the desire by which it is animated to gratify the wishes of the Sultan's Allies. The Porte seems to me to have done more than it was advised by the Great Powers to do, in the way of concession, and that, in so far as the Porte is a party, the question with Mehemet Ali may be considered as settled.

The firman will be sent to Alexandria immediately, accompanied by a letter from the Grand Vizier, explanatory (as I am told) of the conduct of the Sublime Porte.

I inclose a copy of the firman hastily made, and which may have in it some slight inaccuracies. I will forward an authenticated copy without delay.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 48.

Note signed by the Representatives of the Four Powers regarding the new Firman.

NOUS Soussignés, Représentans des Quatre Puissances Alliées de la Sublime Porte, déclarons à sa demande expresse, qu'ayant pris connaissance de nouveau du projet du firman d'investiture à envoyer au Pacha d'Egypte Méhémet Ali Pacha, nous n'y avons rien trouvé qui nous ait paru devoir donner lieu à une objection quelconque de notre part, et qu'il ne nous reste plus, en conséquence, rien à lui demander si ce n'est

qu'elle fasse parvenir ce firman à son adresse le plus promptement possible.

Fait à Emirghian, à l'hôtel de son Excellence Monsieur le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de la Sublime Porte, Méhémet Rifaat Pacha, ce 22 Mai, 1841.

(Signé)

STURMER.
PONSONBY.
KONIGSMARK.
TITOW.

Inclosure 2 in No. 48.

Firman du 13 Février, 1841.*

Nouveau Firman.

(Traduction.)

L'ACTE de soumission que tu viens de faire, les assurances de fidélité et de dévouement que tu as données, et les intentions droites et sincères que tu as manifestées tant à mon égard que dans les intérêts de ma Sublime Porte, sont parvenues à ma connaissance souveraine et m'ont été fort agréables.

En conséquence, et le zèle et la sagacité qui te caractérisent, ainsi que l'expérience et les connaissances que tu as acquises dans les affaires de l'Egypte pendant le long espace de tems que tu as occupé le poste de Gouverneur de l'Egypte, donnant lieu à croire que tu auras acquis des droits à la faveur et à la confiance que je t'accorde, c'est-à-dire, que tu en connaîtras toute la portée et toute la reconnaissance que tu devras en avoir, que tu t'appliqueras à faire en sorte que ces dispositions passent à tes fils et à tes neveux, je t'accorde le gouvernement de l'Egypte dans ses anciennes limites telles qu'on les trouve dans la carte qui t'est envoyée par mon Grand Vizir actuellement en fonctions, munie d'un cachet, avec le privilège additionnel de l'hérédité et avec les conditions suivantes :

Désormais, quand le poste sera vacant, le gouvernement de l'Egypte sera conféré à celui de tes enfans mâles existans que j'aurais préféré et élu, et ce système sera observé également à l'égard de ses enfans mâles.

Si jamais le destin voudra que la ligne masculine soit éteinte, comme dans ce cas ma Sublime Porte devra conférer le gouvernement de l'Egypte à une autre personne, les

le gouvernement de l'Egypte écherra en ligne droite, de l'aîné à l'aîné, dans la race masculine parmi les fils et les petits-fils. Quant à leur nomination, elle se fera de la part de ma Sublime Porte.

* Tout ce qui n'est pas souligné dans ce firman se trouve dans le nouveau firman, et tout ce qui est souligné est changé ou supprimé ou modifié dans le nouveau firman.

enfants mâles nés des filles des Gouverneurs de l'Egypte n'auront aucun droit, aucune capacité légale à la succession au Gouvernement.

Dorénavant, celui d'entre les enfans qui sera élu au gouvernement de l'Egypte devra se rendre en personne à Constantinople pour y recevoir l'investiture de son poste.

Bien que les Pachas d'Egypte aient obtenu le privilège de l'hérédité, ils doivent cependant être considérés, quant à la préséance, comme étant sur un pied d'égalité avec les autres Vizirs, ils seront traités comme les autres Vizirs de ma Sublime Porte, et recevront les mêmes titres que l'on donne aux autres Vizirs quand on leur écrit.

Les ordonnances utiles proclamées par mon Hatti Shériff Impérial de Gulhané, tous les réglemens faits et à faire par ma Sublime Porte, tous les traités conclus et à conclure entre ma Sublime Porte et les Puissances amies, seront complètement mis à exécution dans la Province de l'Egypte aussi;

En Egypte, tous les impôts, tous les revenus, seront perçus et recueillis en mon nom souverain; attendu cependant que les Egyptiens aussi sont les sujets de ma Sublime Porte, et afin qu'un jour ils ne soient pas vexés, la dîme, les droits, et les autres impôts qui seront perçus, le seront sur les mêmes règles qui seront en vigueur dans les autres pays de ma Sublime Porte.

Sur le montant annuel des droits de douane, de la dîme, des impôts, et de toutes les autres espèces de revenus, on en prélèvera d'abord, c'est-à-dire, sans défalquer aucune dépense, la quatrième partie pour compte de ma Sublime Porte. Les autres trois quarts sont laissés afin qu'ils servent à faire face aux frais du recouvrement, à ceux de l'administration intérieure, des établissemens militaires, et pour le trésor particulier des Pachas d'Egypte, et pour le paiement des vivres qu'il est d'usage d'envoyer tous les ans en nature de l'Egypte aux deux Villes Saintes.

Le quantum du tribut qui revient à ma Sublime Porte et le mode de la perception sont exécutoires l'espace de cinq ans, à commencer de l'année 1257 (Février, 1841), après cela, il sera loisible de faire à cet égard de meilleurs arrangemens d'après l'état futur de l'Egypte et les exigences des temps; considérant que c'est un devoir pour ma Sublime Porte de connaître au juste le montant réel des revenus annuels et le

Les principes fondés sur les lois de la sûreté de la vie, de la sûreté de la propriété, et de la conservation de l'honneur, principes consacrés par les ordonnances salutaires de mon Hatti Shériff de Gulhané,

et tous les réglemens faits et à faire par ma Sublime Porte seront aussi mis en pratique en Egypte, en les conciliant le mieux qu'on pourra avec les circonstances locales et les principes de la justice et de l'équité.

conformément au système équitable adopté par ma Sublime Porte, et l'on prendra soin de payer, dès que le temps du payement sera venu, sur les droits de douane, sur la capitation, sur les dîmes, sur les revenus et les autres produits de la Province de l'Egypte, le tribut annuel dont le quantum est inséré et précisé dans un autre firman Impérial.

Etant d'usage d'envoyer tous les ans de l'Egypte des vivres en nature aux deux Villes Saintes, on continuera à envoyer à chaque endroit séparément les vivres et les autres objets, quels qu'ils puissent être, qui y ont été envoyés jusqu'à présent.

mode de perception des dîmes et des autres impôts à prendre des habitans, et attendu que cette connaissance ne peut guère s'obtenir que par l'établissement d'un contrôle, on prendra des mesures conformes aux ordres que je donnerai à cet égard.

Comme ma Sublime Porte a pris la résolution d'améliorer la monnaie qui est l'âme des opérations de la société, et de le faire de manière à ce que désormais il ne puisse y avoir de la variation ni dans l'aloi, ni dans le prix, je permets que l'on batte monnaie en Egypte; mais les monnaies en or et en argent que je te permets de battre, porteront mon nom, et seront tout à fait semblables, sous les rapports du titre, des prix et de la forme, à celles que l'on frappe ici.

En temps de paix, 18,000 hommes suffiront pour le service intérieur de la province de l'Egypte; il ne sera pas permis d'en augmenter le nombre. Mais vu que les troupes de terre et de mer de l'Egypte sont instituées pour le service de ma Sublime Porte, il sera permis, en temps de guerre, de les porter au nombre qui aura été jugé convenable par ma Sublime Porte.

On a adopté le principe que les soldats employés dans les autres parties de mes états serviront pendant cinq ans, au bout duquel terme ils seront échangés contre des recrues. Cela étant, il faut qu'à cet égard l'on suive le même système en Egypte aussi. Par conséquent, il faudra former des soldats le plus récemment incorporés et pris dans les corps des troupes Egyptiennes 20,000 hommes, auxquels on appliquera ensuite le principe du temps de service à compter du jour qu'ils y ont été admis. De ce corps 18,000 hommes seront employés au service intérieur de l'Egypte, et les 2,000 hommes seront employés ici. Et comme la cinquième partie de ces 20,000 hommes devra être remplacée tous les ans, on prendra chaque année sur la population de l'Egypte, en tirant légalement au sort, en s'y prenant mon humanité, et en y observant la plus parfaite impartialité, 4000 hommes, dont 3600 hommes seront retenus en Egypte, et les 400 envoyés à Constantinople. Les soldats qui auront été les premiers à entrer au service, soit ici soit là, et qui auront accompli leur cinquième année de service, seront renvoyés à leurs pays respectifs, et ceux qui auront une fois accompli le terme de service ne seront plus enrôlés.

Cela étant, il faudrait, qu'à cet égard l'on suive le même système en Egypte aussi. Mais par rapport à la durée du service, on s'adaptera aux dispositions des habitans, en observant à leur égard ce que l'équité exige.

Il sera envoyé chaque année à Constantinople 400 hommes pour remplacer d'autres.

Il peut y avoir une différence, à cause du climat, dans l'étoffe servant à l'habillement des troupes en Egypte, mais il ne doit en avoir aucune ni dans l'uniforme, ni dans la coupe des habits, ni dans les marques distinctives des grades, ni dans les drapeaux, entre ces troupes là et les autres troupes de ma Sublime Porte.

Les troupes à employer sur les vaisseaux Egyptiens, officiers et soldats, auront tout-à-fait le même habillement et les mêmes marques distinctives de leurs grades que les troupes d'ici; les bâtimens porteront le même pavillon que ceux d'ici.

Le Gouverneur d'Egypte nommera les officiers de terre et de marine jusqu'au grade de Col-Agassi, grade immédiatement au-dessous de celui de Chef de Bataillon. Quant aux nominations aux grades supérieurs à celui de Col-Agassi, il faudra absolument en demander la permission et prendre mes ordres là-dessus.

Dorénavant les Pachas d'Egypte ne pourront pas faire construire des bâtimens de guerre sans en avoir demandé la permission de la Sublime Porte, et en avoir obtenu une autorisation claire et positive.

Attendu que chacune des conditions arrêtées comme ci-dessus est adhérente au privilège de l'hérédité, si une seule d'elles n'est pas exécutée, ce privilège d'hérédité sera aussitôt aboli et annulé.

Telle étant ma volonté suprême sur tous les points ci-dessus énoncés, toi, tes enfans et tes descendans, reconnaissons de cette haute faveur souveraine, vous vous empresserez toujours à exécuter scrupuleusement les conditions établies, vous vous garderez bien d'y contrevenir, vous aurez soin d'assurer le repos et la tranquillité des Egyptiens en les mettant à l'abri de toutes injures et de toutes vexations, vous ferez des rapports ici et demanderez des ordres sur les affaires importantes qui concernent ces pays là, étant à ces fins que le présent firman Impérial qui est orné de mon rescrit Souverain a été écrit et vous est envoyé.

Il n'y aura aucune différence entre les marques distinctives et les drapeaux des troupes qui seront employés là et les marques distinctives et les drapeaux des autres troupes de ma Sublime Porte. Les officiers de marine Egyptienne auront les mêmes marques distinctives de grades, et les Egyptiens auront les mêmes pavillons que les officiers et les bâtimens d'ici.

Colonel, c'est-à-dire de Pachas Miri Ivi (Généraux de Brigade) et de Pachas Férik (Généraux de division).

No. 49.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 12.)

(No. 172.)

My Lord,

Therapia, May 23, 1841.

I HAVE the honour to inclose translation I have just received of a firman specifying the amount and mode of payment of the tribute imposed upon the Pasha of Egypt by the Sublime Porte.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 49.

Firman addressed to Mehemet Ali.

Traduction.)

Toi Vizir sus-mentionné!

COMME tu as été confirmé dans le gouvernement de l'Egypte avec hérédité, aux conditions résolutives qui sont insérées dans un autre firman, ma Volonté Souveraine est, que tu ayes à payer annuellement pour ma Sublime Porte, sur les droits de douane, sur les dîmes et la capitation, et sur les autres revenus et produits de cette province, un tribut de 80,000 bourses*; qu'afin que le montant du tribut ne varie pas, puisque les prix des monnaies changent, on ait à calculer la somme de 80,000 bourses sur les prix des Colonnates d'Espagne qui sont en crédit en Egypte; et que le montant actuel des Colonnates soit payé chaque année en nature, ou bien que son équivalent soit payé en d'autres bonnes monnaies. Tels sont mes ordres, en conséquence desquels le présent firman Impérial a été écrit et envoyé.

Ainsi, lorsque tu auras appris de quoi il s'agit, tu agiras de la manière ci-dessus énoncée, et tu auras soin de payer au trésor Impérial, dès que le temps du paiement sera arrivé, le tribut ci-dessus énoncé.

No. 50.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 12.)

(Separate and Confidential.)

My Lord,

May 20, 1841.

I HAVE received (privately sent) a message from Rifaat Pasha couched in the following words. It is dated May 12, 1841:—"Rifaat Pacha m'a exprimé le désir que la Sublime Porte avait que la Grande Bretagne s'intéressât par ses bons offices et sur la recommandation de votre Excellence, qu'il fût ajouté dans la Convention projetée et paraphée à cinq à Londres, la phrase suivante: 'l'intégrité et l'indépendance de l'Empire Ottoman étant nécessaire à la balance des Pouvoirs de l'Europe, il a été convenu que aucune Puissance Européenne à aucun époque ne pourra intervenir dans les événemens ou les affaires intérieures de cet Empire.' Rifaat Pacha en concluait, que par l'addition de cette clause, la Russie et une autre Puissance aussi s'abstiendraient dorénavant d'intervenir dans les troubles de Candie, et de l'Archipel, ainsi que dans les affaires de la Servie, la Valachie, la Moldavie et la Bulgarie, au-delà des

* 80,000 bourses, ou 40,000,000 de piastres Turque, faisant à présent à peu près £363,635 sterling.—Note du Traducteur.

limites prescrites par les traités existans avec chaque Puissance et, que ainsi les instigateurs et les fauteurs des troubles se trouveraient découragés. Rifaat Pacha entame cette question avec votre Excellence sur le pied confidentiel, et lui manifeste le désir de la Sublime Porte, et il fait entendre qu'à l'occasion de cette Convention, la Légation Française promet à la Sublime Porte de lui rendre de grands services après la solution de la Question Egyptienne."

I replied to the message, that I would make it known to your Lordship, but doubted of the introduction of such a clause in the projected Treaty being feasible. Rifaat Pasha sent another message, dated May 17, as follows:—

"Le Pacha prie votre Excellence qu'elle veuille bien procéder à la réalisation du désir de la Sublime Porte, de manière que rien ne soit arrêté ou stipulé à Londres, avant qu'on n'ait pris préalablement l'avis de la Sublime Porte sur les termes de l'Article en question, et il désire que le projet de cet Article fût mis à la connaissance et à l'approbation de la Sublime Porte."

I replied, that I would communicate to your Lordship the wishes of the Sublime Porte.

I have thought it best to make this literal copy of the message.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 51.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

(No. 147.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, June 15, 1841.

I HAVE received your Excellency's "separate and confidential" despatch of the 20th of May, respecting a wish expressed to you by Rifaat Pasha, that in the Convention of which the draft was initialed on the 15th of March by the Plenipotentiaries of Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, and the Sublime Porte, an Article should be inserted to the effect, "that the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire being necessary to the balance of power in Europe, it has been agreed that no European Power shall at any time interfere in the concerns or internal affairs of that Empire."

I have to instruct your Excellency to state to the Turkish Government, with reference to the abovementioned communication, that when the Draft of Convention which was agreed upon in March last, and of which a copy was transmitted to your Excellency in my despatch No. 50 of the 16th of March, was initialed by the Plenipotentiaries of the Five Powers and by the Turkish Ambassador, there was a clear understanding between the parties, that no alteration should afterwards be made in it, and that it should be signed as it stands. It would therefore be impossible now to add to it the Article suggested by Rifaat Pasha without the consent of all the parties, and there is reason to suppose that some of the parties might object to it.

But such an Article would probably not have the effect which Rifaat Pasha expects; for if either France or Russia should wish to interfere in the affairs of Candia, or of the Archipelago, or of Servia, or of the Principalities, they would, if Turkey was weak, easily find some pretext for doing so, notwithstanding any such stipulation as that suggested by the Porte.

The truth is, that the most effectual means which the Porte can use to prevent any improper and uncalled-for interference of foreign Powers in the internal affairs of the Turkish Empire, will be, first, to take care that the Pashas and other officers of the Sultan shall govern the people of all races and religions with mildness, forbearance, and justice, so as to give the subjects of the Sultan no real cause for discontent, in order that

thus the tranquillity of the country may remain undisturbed; and, secondly, so to improve the organization and efficiency of the Turkish army and navy, that foreign Powers may respect the strength of the Ottoman Empire, and may be unwilling to run the risk of giving unnecessary cause of dissatisfaction to the Sultan.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 52.

Viscount Palmerston to Viscount Ponsonby.

(No. 154.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, June 15, 1841.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 168, of the 22nd of May, inclosing a copy of the answer which you returned to Rifaat Pasha on the 18th of May, on the subject of the draft of an amended firman to be addressed to the Pasha of Egypt, which Rifaat Pasha communicated to yourself and to your Colleagues: and I have to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve that answer.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 53.

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer.

(No. 76.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 11, 1841.

I HAVE been prevented by a variety of circumstances from sooner answering your despatch No. 66 of the 28th ult., in which you give me an account of the substance of a despatch from the Baron de Bourqueney, which was read to you by M. Guizot, and of a conversation which you had with M. Guizot upon the subject of that despatch.

But as it appears by your despatch that M. Guizot is under a mistaken impression as to what passed between me and the Baron de Bourqueney in the conversation of which the Baron de Bourqueney made a report in the despatch which M. Guizot read to you, it is necessary that I should send you a correct statement of what passed between me and the Baron de Bourqueney on that occasion.

The Baron de Bourqueney having called upon me in consequence of a note which I had written to him requesting him to do so, I stated that I had wished to see him in order to tell him that my Colleagues in the Conference began to be impatient for the signature of the Convention between the Five Powers about the Dardanelles and Bosphorus, the draft of which we had initialed on the 15th of March, and I had been requested by them to ask him whether he was then empowered and prepared to sign that Convention.

He said, that he was not yet authorized to sign that Convention, but would write immediately to Paris for an authority to do so, and had no doubt of obtaining that authority, if I would communicate to him, for the purpose of its being transmitted to his Government, a copy of the Memorandum from the Turkish Government which Chekib Effendi had then recently communicated to me, and in which the Porte announces its intention that the Hatti Sheriff which the Sultan sent on the 13th of February to Mehemet Ali, specifying the conditions attached to his appointment as hereditary Pasha of Egypt should be modified, in regard to the mode of succession, with respect to the manner of fixing the amount of tribute, and as to the rule about military promotions.

I said, that I could not well send him a written copy of that Memorandum, or of the note by which Chekib Effendi had communicated it to me, because to do so would look as if the Four Powers had been required by France to compel the Sultan to modify his Hatti Sheriff, and as if, having done so, they were rendering to France an account of the manner in which they had carried her desires into execution. This, I said, France herself had never asked, but, on the contrary, the French Government has declared that it would have nothing to do with the execution of the Treaty of July.

Baron de Bourqueney fully concurred in this statement, and said that it would be enough if I would declare to him that the Treaty of July has been fully executed and worked out, and that nothing can now happen that can lead the Four Powers to deliberate upon any matter arising out of or directly connected with the engagements of that Treaty. He said, that although France has certainly declared that she will have nothing to do with the execution of the Treaty of July, and is willing to sign the initialed Convention about the Straits, yet she cannot well sign that Convention until she shall know that the temporary engagements of the Treaty of July have been fully executed and worked out. Because it would place the French Government in an awkward and embarrassing position, if, after France, as one of Five, had signed a Treaty connected with the affairs of the Levant, the other Four should have occasion to deliberate without France upon a matter connected with those affairs.

I said, that undoubtedly this was consistent with what he had said to me at the time when the Draft of Convention was agreed to and initialed, and that now as well as then, I must admit that there was reason in his statement; that, at all events, the French Government is the only judge of what suits it in this matter, and that I did not see that the Four Powers could justly object to the line which, according to M. de Bourqueney, it intended to pursue. But I said, that I regretted that it was not in my power to make to him the declaration which he required as a preliminary condition for the signature of the Convention by France.

I said, that by the Treaty of July, 1840, the Four Powers took towards the Sultan an engagement "to determine Mehemet Ali to conform to the arrangement specified in the Separate Act annexed to that Treaty." That this arrangement consisted of two parts, one regarding territory, the other regarding the relations of Mehemet Ali as a subject towards the Sultan as his Sovereign.

The first part, I said, has been fully executed by the expulsion of Mehemet Ali's troops and authorities from Syria; the second has been in some degree executed by the restitution of the Turkish fleet; but other portions of this second part have not yet been conformed to by Mehemet Ali, and those portions relate to matters which are of fundamental importance, and which the Four Powers have, in the Collective Notes addressed by their Representatives in London to Chekib Effendi, declared to be absolutely indispensable conditions. The points which I particularly alluded to were, I said, the stipulations of the Separate Act which declare, that all the Laws and all the Treaties of the Ottoman Empire shall apply to Egypt as much as to every other province of that empire; and that Mehemet Ali should levy only the taxes and imposts established by law.

I said, that I had indeed received a letter from Commodore Napier, which was written from Alexandria on the 22nd of February, two days after the arrival of the Turkish Commissioner with the Hatti Sheriffs, and which letter Commodore Napier had shown to Mehemet Ali, or Boghos Bey, before he sent it off, in order to be sure that he rightly stated Mehemet Ali's intentions; and in that letter Sir Charles Napier said, that Mehemet Ali had unconditionally accepted those Articles of the Hatti Sheriff which stated that the Laws and Treaties of the empire should be fully applicable to Egypt as well as to all the other provinces, and that none but the legal taxes should be levied by Mehemet Ali; but I said, that nevertheless, Mehemet Ali at the same time that he was giving these assurances to Sir Charles Napier was writing very differently to the Grand Vizier; and in his letter to the Vizier, which is the only communication which he has hitherto made to the Porte on these matters, he very civilly indeed, but

very plainly and positively, declines to apply and execute in Egypt the Laws and Treaties of the empire, or to restrict himself to levying none but the taxes which are or may be established by law.

I said, that as this refusal of his had been mixed up with his remonstrance against those other parts of the Hatti Sheriff which the Sultan had since agreed to modify, it is very probable, that when the modifications which have been made by the Sultan shall become known to Mehemet Ali, Mehemet Ali will withdraw his objections to those conditions which the Four Powers have, upon full consideration, declared to be indispensable, and it is to be hoped that Mehemet Ali will send in his complete, unreserved and unconditional acquiescence in the terms of the Hatti Sheriff, as definitively settled by the Porte.

But if, contrary to all just and reasonable expectation, this should not happen, and if Mehemet Ali should still be contumacious, the Sultan would probably address himself thereupon to his Four Allies, and it is impossible that the Four Powers should not have to deliberate together as to what, in such a state of things, the engagements of the Treaty of July, 1840, would require them to do.

I said, that of course I could not know beforehand what the result of such a deliberation might be; and it was obvious that such result would depend upon the circumstances of the case; but to tell him frankly my own opinion, I thought it fair to say, that it seemed to me that in such a case if the Sultan were to apply to the Four Powers, in virtue of the Treaty of July, to assist him in compelling Mehemet Ali to submit to the arrangement specified in the Separate Act annexed to that Treaty, the Four Powers would be bound in honour to comply with that demand, and there could be no doubt of their being able to carry their engagement into effect.

I said, that thus he would see, that although it is extremely improbable that the Four Powers can have occasion again to deliberate with a view to any measures in pursuance of engagements they have contracted by the Treaty of July, because it is highly unlikely that Mehemet Ali can continue contumacious upon the points which I had mentioned, yet such a case is not impossible, and therefore I could not make to Baron de Bourqueney the declaration which he required.

He said, that this being so, he did not see how he could write to M. Guizot for an authority to sign the initialed Convention, because in applying for such authority, he would be obliged to report the explanation which I had just given him, and that explanation would render it impossible for M. Guizot, with reference to parliamentary and other domestic considerations, to send him an authority to sign; what then could be done? there seemed to him no choice but to wait some time longer, and still to postpone the signature of the Convention.

I said that, according to the view which the French Government took of the matter, and which I could not say was an unreasonable one, there seemed to be no alternative but to wait; and it appeared to me that we must soon hear from Alexandria that everything was satisfactorily adjusted. I observed, that the advice which the French Government has been lately giving to Mehemet Ali, and its declaration that it would not support him in pretensions which it pronounced to be unreasonable, must have a great effect upon his determination, and would probably lead him to give way.

I said, however, that I was ready to sign the proposed Convention at once and immediately; that day, the next day, any day. That it would be convenient to Her Majesty's Government, with reference to domestic considerations, that the Convention should be signed; and that its being signed would be useful for European purposes, because it would render Mehemet Ali more disposed to give way upon the points on which he still holds out; for if France had signed the new Convention, he would give up all hope of support from her; whereas, while she holds off from the other Powers, he will always speculate upon receiving assistance from her, whatever her Government and its Agents may tell him to the contrary.

The Baron de Bourqueney assured me that M. de Chabot had been instructed to state to Mehemet Ali in the plainest manner, that his

pretensions upon all points, except the three with regard to which the Sultan has agreed to modify his Hatti Sheriff, are untenable and groundless, and to declare to him, that the French Government will give him no countenance whatever in maintaining those unreasonable pretensions.

The Baron de Bourqueney concluded by saying that, under all circumstances, he saw nothing that the French Government could do but to wait; but he said he trusted confidently that this further delay would not be charged against France as an indication of any wish on her part to recede from the initialed Convention; and he hoped that it would not be put forward by any of the Four Powers as a ground for a change of purpose on their part, and for a refusal on their side to sign when France may think herself at liberty to do so.

I said, that I would undertake to justify to my Colleagues in the Conference the further delay asked for by France, and that I was quite prepared to say that the grounds alleged by Baron de Bourqueney for that delay, appeared to me to be reasonable, although at the same time, I thought that the French Government might with perfect consistency wave those grounds if it thought proper to do so. And I also said, that I was quite sure that none of the Four Powers would ever think of making the present delay of France, a ground for a refusal on their part to sign by and by the initialed Convention.

From this statement I think it will be seen that it cannot justly be alleged, as you report M. Guizot to have stated to you, that "the objection and the delay to sign the initialed Convention proceed from the Government of Great Britain." On the contrary, the Government of Great Britain is ready to sign that Convention immediately, and the objection and the delay proceed from the Government of France, which Government refuses to sign, unless the British Government makes a previous declaration, which cannot be made in the present state of things. Her Majesty's Government, however, do not throw any blame upon that of France for this delay. The French Government has a full right to judge for itself on this matter, and it is due to Baron de Bourqueney that I should repeat that the objection on which he has founded this delay, is not a new one put forward for the occasion, but is entirely in accordance with the language which he held when the Convention was originally discussed.

You will give a copy of this despatch to M. Guizot.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 54.

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer.

(No. 77.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 11, 1841.

WITH reference to my despatch, No. 76, of this day, I have to observe, that although the reason alleged by the French Government for delaying to sign the initialed Convention is perfectly reasonable in itself, and cannot be gainsaid; yet there is no difficulty in seeing what the real object of the French Government is, in pursuing the course which it follows in this matter. The French Government has said that it does make its signature of the proposed Convention depend upon the decision of the Sultan, but that it does not make its signature depend on the decision of Mehemet Ali; that it will sign the Convention the moment that it shall learn officially from the Four Powers, that the Sultan has modified the conditions of his first Hatti Sheriff about the mode in which Mehemet Ali's family shall succeed to the Pashalic of Egypt, about the manner in which the amount of the tribute is to be fixed, and about the degree of military rank up to which the Pasha of Egypt is to be allowed to select officers for promotion; and that it will not postpone signing the

Convention in order to learn what answer Mehemet Ali may give to the Sultan's Hatti Sheriff so modified.

This proceeding of the French Government, at first sight, seems to be very fair, and has the appearance of an intention to withdraw all support from Mehemet Ali, and to leave him to his fate as soon as the Sultan has complied with the recommendation of the Four Powers.

But upon a closer examination, the course thus pursued by the French Government will be seen to be only a continuation of that systematic support which France has for a long period given upon every occasion to Mehemet Ali, more or less openly, according to the circumstances of the moment. Because the French Government, though it says it is ready to sign the Convention now that the Sultan has modified his Hatti Sheriff, nevertheless requires the Four Powers to make a preliminary declaration, that the Treaty of July has been fully executed and worked out, and that nothing can happen which can lead the Four Powers again to deliberate with a view to take measures in execution of the engagements of that Treaty. But if, in the present state of things, the Four Powers were to make such a declaration, what would be the consequence thereof? Why that Mehemet Ali would have the benefit of the Sultan's modification of those Articles which the Four Powers advised him to modify; and that Mehemet Ali would also have the benefit of his own refusal to accede to those other conditions of the Hatti Sheriff which the Four Powers have declared to be indispensable. For, on the one hand, the Sultan could not retract the concessions which he has made; and, on the other hand, the Four Powers would have declared that they considered the Treaty of July fully accomplished and executed, although they knew at the time when they made that declaration, that Mehemet Ali was refusing compliance with some of the conditions of the Separate Act; and therefore both Mehemet Ali and the French Government would assert, with some show of reason, that the Four Powers intended by their declaration to give up the unexecuted conditions of the Separate Act, and no longer to insist upon the acceptance of those conditions by Mehemet Ali.

Mehemet Ali would, consequently, persist in his refusal to admit that the Laws and Treaties of the Ottoman Empire should be carried into execution in Egypt; and he would continue to maintain that he must be at liberty to levy what taxes and imposts he pleases in Egypt, without confining himself to the taxes established by law.

Mehemet Ali would thus have carried all his points; and if at some future time the Sultan were to prepare to employ force, in order to compel him to conform to the Laws and Treaties of the Ottoman Empire, France would step in, and remonstrate in behalf of Mehemet Ali, saying to the Sultan, that the Four Powers had, in 1841, deliberately and purposely absolved Mehemet Ali from those conditions of the Treaty of July, 1840, because they had declared that Treaty to be fulfilled and worked out, although at the time when they made that declaration, they knew that Mehemet Ali was still refusing to comply with those conditions; and France would say, moreover, that the declaration so made by the Four Powers had been exacted from them by her, as the price of her signature to the Convention about the Straits; and that, consequently, she was fully entitled, and even in honour bound, to prevent the Sultan from depriving Mehemet Ali of privileges and immunities which had been granted to him in 1841, at her especial intercession.

It is obvious that, by such a course of things, France would entirely turn the tables upon the Four Powers; because she would first boast, that out of deference to her desire the Four Powers had made the Sultan modify his Hatti Sheriff, and she would then declare that at her bidding the Four Powers had released Mehemet Ali from conditions distinctly specified in the Treaty of July, and subsequently declared by the Four Powers in the Collective Notes of their Representatives at London to be indispensably necessary.

This would be a great and an unnecessary humiliation for the Four Powers; and however dextrous the manner in which France endeavours to impose it, her attempt ought to be firmly and decidedly resisted.

If France really wishes to sign the Convention, and if she is sincere in stating that she cannot sign as one of Five, till she is sure that the other Four will not have to deliberate without her, she has only to exert that influence at Alexandria, which, notwithstanding all that is said to the contrary, is well-known to be still paramount, and thus to compel Mehemet Ali to signify to the Sultan his full and formal acquiescence in all the provisions of the modified Hatti Sheriff.

I have stated all this more than once to Prince Esterhazy, to Baron Neumann, and to Baron Bülow, and you are authorized to read this despatch confidentially to Count Appony and to the Prussian Minister. You will also read to them my other despatch of this day's date.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 55.

Viscount Palmerston to Mr. Bulwer.

(No. 78.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, June 12, 1841.

I HAVE this morning received a despatch from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, reporting that Mehemet Ali has given orders for building two new ships of the line.

You will communicate this fact to the French Government; and you will observe to them that one of the few conditions of the Hatti Sheriff of the 13th of February last, which Mehemet Ali accepted without reserve, was, that he should build no more ships of the line without the previous sanction of the Sultan.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) PALMERSTON.

No. 56.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 18.)

(No. 177.)

My Lord,

Therapia, May 26, 1841.

I HAVE again urged Rifaat Pasha to expedite the despatch of the firman to Alexandria. I hope it will be done directly.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 57.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 18.)

(Separate.)

My Lord,

Therapia, May 26, 1841.

I HAVE to apologize for making this despatch separate, by alleging that I am not sure of the number of the last, and am unable to ascer-

tain it at the late hour of the night at which I am obliged to write, in order to catch the post before its departure.

I have received an answer from his Excellency Rifaat Pasha to my letter urging the Porte to send the firman to Alexandria. His Excellency says that he concurs with me in all I said on the subject, and will urge the council to complete the vizirial letter, and that I may be certain the firman will be sent from hence in three or four days. It appears that the vizirial letter has been found difficult to draw up; and it also appears that the ministers had no steamer to carry the firman, and have been obliged to wait for the return of one sent to Candia, and which is expected to arrive here to-morrow or the next day at the latest.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 58.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 21.)

(No. 109.)

My Lord,

Paris, June 18, 1841.

I RECEIVED a note from M. Guizot yesterday, begging me to defer my visit to him till to-day. I consequently called upon his Excellency this morning, and then asked him whether he had again read through the despatch No. 76 which I had the honour to communicate to him on Tuesday? M. Guizot said that he was going to a council at eleven, that he could not speak on that matter till after the council, and again alluded to the expression, "the further delay asked for by France," which he said he must reply to.

I then begged to know what intelligence had arrived from Constantinople and Alexandria?

From Constantinople the French Government has received the information that the firman was sent off on the 31st of May, and that it specifies the tribute at 80,000 purses. (I may as well mention, since I have seen various values given to this Turkish mode of estimation, that a purse is about 125 francs; and that consequently 80,000 purses is 10,000,000 francs, or about 400,000*l.*)

The news from Alexandria is not yet arrived, but we calculated that it might reach here to-morrow or next day, and contain the definitive answer of the Pasha.

As the messenger Fricker informs me that he is not particularly wanted in London, and our ordinary courier leaves Paris this evening, I have thought it convenient for the public service to detain Fricker until to-morrow or Sunday, when, under all circumstances, I shall despatch him.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) HENRY LYTTON BULWER.

No. 59.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 21.)

(No. 111.)

My Lord,

Paris, June 18, 1841.

YOUR Lordship's messenger arrived at Paris on Monday, and having had your Lordship's despatch No. 76 copied, I called on M. Guizot with it on the following morning.

I thought it best, however, in the first instance, to read to M. Guizot that portion of my own despatch No. 66, to which your Lordship replied, in order that I might be sure that I had faithfully given to your Lordship, the spirit and the substance of the conversation which I had had the honour of reporting.

On M. Guizot observing that the report in question had accurately given the sense (I could not pretend in every instance to give the precise terms) of his observations, and of that despatch of M. de Bourqueney's which he had read to me, I read to his Excellency the account which your Lordship gives me (No. 76) of the interview between your Lordship and the French Chargé d'Affaires.

To this M. Guizot listened with silent attention until he came to the phrase "the further delay asked for by France," when he declared with some vehemence that he had never asked, nor had M. de Bourqueney asked in his name for any delay; that he had always held the same language, namely, that he would sign the Convention of March when the Treaty of July was declared to be at an end, and not before; that he had never yet asked for any delay, and did not now do so.

I begged him to allow me to proceed with the despatch since I had begun to read it, and that he would then better see and seize its whole meaning, and that, moreover, it was my intention and in conformity with my instructions, to leave the copy I had in my hand with him. Subsequently, when I had concluded the despatch, M. Guizot again recurred to the obnoxious passage, by which he seemed much ruffled; I observed that I thought, considering the structure of the phrase in question, and of the despatch in general, that he attached an exaggerated importance to the word "asked," and that the whole pith of the matter lay in this simple exposition of facts, viz., That the Government of Her Majesty were willing now, and had always been willing to sign the initialed Convention, and that the Government of France was now willing to sign it, after a certain declaration on the part of Her Majesty's Government, which your Lordship did not think it consistent with the circumstances of the moment to make; that such being the case, the British Government could not be accused of delaying an affair it was willing to conclude, and that your Lordship on the other hand did not blame the French Government, (though you might differ from it in opinion,) for thinking that the declaration which at the moment could not be given, should be a preliminary to the signature desired.

M. Guizot then said, that neither did he for his part blame the British Government for the line it adopted, but that he could not but observe that the language held to M. de Bourqueney on the 10th of March, (I think that was the date,) was different from that since employed; and he turned to a despatch of M. de Bourqueney, of, I believe, March the 11th, and read me a passage of which I can only give the meaning, which was, that he (M. de Bourqueney) had asked on that occasion the different members of the Conference whether they considered that there was any chance of either a moral or material force (such I think were the words) being used to compel Mehemet Ali to subscribe to the conditions which the Sultan imposed; that the Representatives of Prussia and Austria answered, "non, mille fois non," and that your Lordship, taking more time to consider, answered in effect (I cannot recollect the exact passage, which is long, in M. de Bourqueney's despatch), though less warmly, in the same manner.

"Thus," said M. Guizot, "I was assured on the 10th of March that no force of any kind could be employed against Mehemet Ali, and now I am told that it may; I do not find fault with this difference, but I point it out."

I said that I was not in possession from my Government of what passed on the occasion he alluded to, and therefore I could not speak of it; but that if a different language was held now, as to the chances of having to compel Mehemet Ali to assume his situation as a vassal of the Porte, the conduct of Mehemet Ali himself on whom those chances depended might be different; and I then informed M. Guizot of the intelligence your Lordship had just received from Constantinople as to

the two new vessels which he (the Pasha) was now building. Finally, our conversation concluded by my leaving the despatch No. 76 with M. Guizot, and agreeing to call again on Thursday morning, when he would speak to me further on the subject, and when I also expected that he would have received some intelligence from Alexandria which might bring the whole of this question to a termination.

I have &c.,
(Signed) HENRY LYTTON BULWER.

No. 60.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 23.)

(No. 114.)

My Lord,

Paris, June 20, 1841.

THE despatches arrived this morning from Alexandria are not of a later date than the 26th, consequently they contain no intelligence of importance; another courier is shortly expected, but I have thought it better under these circumstances to order back the messenger Fricker to London.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) HENRY LYTTON BULWER.

No. 61.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 23.)

(No. 118.)

My Lord,

Paris, June 21, 1841.

ALTHOUGH you have probably received the same information from other quarters, I take the liberty of observing, since the amount of tribute demanded from Mehemet Ali may be a subject of controversy, that 12,000 purses formed, as I understand, the original tribute which the Pasha paid when the piastre was worth four times its present amount, and when, consequently, 12,000 purses might be considered as 48,000 at this time.

The difference, therefore, between the sum now demanded and that formerly paid is not as may be contended 68,000, but 32,000 purses.

All persons conversant with the changes which Turkish coin has undergone of late years, will admit this explanation.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) HENRY LYTTON BULWER.

No. 62.

M. Guizot to the Baron de Bourqueney.—(Communicated to Lord Palmerston by the Baron de Bourqueney, June 24, 1841.)

Monsieur le Baron,

Paris, le 18 Juin, 1841.

JE vous envoie ci-joint, copie d'une dépêche, en date du 11 de ce mois, que Lord Palmerston a écrite à M. Bulwer, en le chargeant de m'en donner communication. Comme vous le verrez, elle a pour objet de

rectifier les impressions inexactes que le Gouvernement du Roi aurait reçues sur le sens des explications qui ont eu lieu, le 24 Mai dernier, entre Lord Palmerston et vous, lorsqu'il vous a exprimé, au nom de la Conférence, le vœu que le paraphe apposé à la Convention du 15 Mars fut transformé en signature définitive. Je ne m'attacherai pas à relever les différences que je remarque entre le récit que fait Lord Palmerston, de ces explications, et celui que vous m'en avez adressé vous-même le 25 Mai dernier. La dépêche que vient de me communiquer M. Bulwer, a été rédigée près de trois semaines après l'entretien auquel elle se rapporte, et lorsque cet entretien était déjà devenu l'objet de discussions qui ont pu, même à l'insu de Lord Palmerston, influencer sur ses souvenirs. Mon intention est d'éviter toute controverse qui ne serait pas absolument indispensable et n'aurait d'autre effet que d'introduire dans la grande question qui nous occupe, de nouvelles et inutiles difficultés. Mais j'ai besoin, et c'est mon devoir, de bien établir, en rappelant simplement les faits, la scrupuleuse conséquence de notre conduite depuis l'ouverture de cette négociation, et notre loyale disposition à transformer maintenant notre paraphe en signature définitive, sans rien changer aux termes auxquels nous avons, dès le premier jour, attaché cette transformation.

Quand la Conférence de Londres nous a invités, le 5 Mars dernier, à consacrer, en commun avec les Puissances signataires du Traité du 15 Juillet, le principe de la clôture des détroits, elle nous a adressé cette invitation parcequ'elle considérait la Question Turco-Egyptienne comme terminée, et en nous déclarant que telle était sa ferme conviction.

Les actes mêmes qu'on avait préparés, et qui nous ont été communiqués à cette époque, ne laissent à cet égard aucun doute. Le Protocole signé le 5 Mars entre les Plénipotentiaires des Quatre Puissances, affirme que les circonstances qui ont motivé le départ de leurs Consuls d'Alexandrie, ont cessé d'exister. Le projet de Protocole qui invite la France à consacrer le principe de la clôture des détroits, déclare que les difficultés qui ont déterminé le Sultan à réclamer l'appui des Cours d'Autriche, de la Grande Bretagne, de Prusse, et de Russie, viennent d'être applanies. Tous ces documents ont précisément pour objet d'établir que la Question Turco-Egyptienne est close en principe, que l'invitation adressée à la France est la conséquence de cette clôture, et que notre signature de la Convention projetée aura pour effet de la constater définitivement.

En même temps qu'elles exprimaient à la France cette conviction, les Puissances tenaient, à la Porte elle-même, un langage encore plus positif, s'il est possible. Dans la note adressée le 12 Mars à Chékib Effendi, elles prennent acte de la communication par laquelle la Porte leur annonce que la question d'Egypte se trouve terminée; elles expriment leur vive satisfaction de voir ainsi pleinement réalisées les intentions bienveillantes de la Convention du 15 Juillet; et en parlant des discussions auxquelles pourrait donner lieu, entre le Sultan et le Pacha, le Hatti Shériff du 13 Février, elles déclarent formellement que c'est à l'autorité seule du Sultan qu'il appartient aujourd'hui de résoudre les questions d'administration intérieure qui restent encore à régler, et qu'elles n'entreront point, à cet égard, dans un examen qui ne serait point de leur ressort.

Enfin je lis dans votre dépêche du 11 Mars, comme je vous l'ai déjà rappelé le 31 Mai dernier, ce résumé de vos conversations, à cette époque, avec les Plénipotentiaires d'Angleterre, d'Autriche et de Prusse:

"Ya-t-il possibilité d'appui prêté par les Puissances au Sultan, en vertu du Traité du 15 Juillet, pour forcer Méhémet Ali à accepter les conditions du Hatti Shériff?"

"A l'unanimité.—Non."

"Ya-t-il possibilité d'intervention diplomatique, sous forme d'acte émané du centre de Londres, pour le règlement de cette question intérieure?"

"La Prusse et l'Autriche: 'Non, décidément.' Lord Palmerston, après avoir cherché dans son imagination comme pour ne pas encourir la responsabilité d'une assertion légèrement avancée:—Il serait possible, quoique invraisemblable, que la Porte nous demandât des explications sur quelques parties de la Note responsive du 30 Janvier, auquel cas,

chacun de nous lui répondrait pour les confirmer dans le sens que nous avons compris nous-mêmes et que vous avez approuvé."

En présence de faits si positifs, de déclarations si claires et si unanimes, le Gouvernement du Roi ne pouvait conserver, quant à la clôture en principe de la Question Turco-Egyptienne, aucune incertitude, aucun doute. Ce fut dans cette confiance que, d'après les ordres du Roi, je vous autorisai, le 13 Mars, à parapher le projet de Convention relatif aux détroits, lorsque le Projet de Protocole éventuel qui nous invitait à signer cette Convention, aurait été également paraphé par les Plénipotentiaires des Quatre Cours; et la signature définitive fut ajournée, d'un commun accord, au moment où la Porte, en modifiant, d'après les conseils de ses Alliés, quelques dispositions du Hatti Shériff du 13 Février contre lesquelles Méhémet Ali avait élevé des réclamations que les Puissances elles-mêmes jugeaient fondées, aurait donné à l'Europe la certitude que la Question Turco-Egyptienne, déjà close en principe, était également terminée en fait, et n'offrait plus aucun intérêt Européen.

Ce qu'on attendait est maintenant accompli. La Porte a suivi les sages conseils qui lui ont été donnés; le Hatti Shériff du 13 Février a été modifié dans celles de ses dispositions qui pouvaient amener des complications nouvelles et graves. Le Gouvernement du Roi n'a rien à ajouter, rien à changer aux intentions qu'il a manifestées, aux engagements qu'il a contractés le 15 Mars dernier, en paraphant le Projet de Convention relatif aux détroits. Il n'a demandé et ne demande aucune déclaration nouvelle, aucun délai nouveau. Il lui suffit de rappeler et de maintenir ce qu'il a dit et ce qu'on lui a dit au début de cette négociation. Il reconnaît que la circonstance à laquelle il avait attaché le transformation du paraphe en signature définitive se trouve réalisée, et il est prêt à donner cette signature, pourvu que les Puissances, qui au mois de Mars dernier regardaient déjà la Question Turco-Egyptienne comme close, et ont paraphé alors le Protocole éventuel qui le déclare, persistent aujourd'hui dans leur conviction, transforment, selon leur promesse, le paraphe de ce Protocole en signature définitive, et témoignent ainsi d'un commun accord que le terme de cette affaire est enfin arrivé, et qu'il ne saurait plus y avoir lieu de leur part, en vertu du Traité du 15 Juillet, à aucune intervention prolongée ou renouvelée.

Vous voudrez bien, Monsieur, donner à Lord Palmerston communication de cette dépêche, et lui en laisser copie.

Recevez, &c.,
(Signé) GUIZOT.

No. 63.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 184.)

My Lord,

Therapia, June 2, 1841.

HIS Excellency the Internuncio had the goodness to communicate to me the inclosed papers from Alexandria.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 63.

Extract of a Letter from Alexandria, dated May 16, 1841.

LA popolazione Franca di Alessandria, la quale teneva per definiti gli affari concernenti la vertenza Turco-Egiziana, rimase per così dire stordita sentendo che i Signori Consoli Generali avevano ricevuto l'ordine di ritardare la loro partenza per qui.

Tutti i timori già da qualche tempo assopiti, si risvegliarono. Ognuno teme nuove complicazioni, e già pare a molti di rivedere sull'orizzonte i vascelli Inglesi che minacciano di bombardare Alessandria. Quelli stessi che poc'anzi baldanzosi tenevano le cose per definitivamente concluse, e speravano in un felice avvenire, sono ora perplessi e prevedono male, se una pronta soluzione delle complicazioni sopraggiunte non viene a porre un termine a questo stato d'incertezza.

I partigiani poi del Governo Egiziano cantano vittoria. Assicurano che il Pascià ha ottenuto tutte le modificazioni che avea chieste, e vanno perfino a ridersi delle Quattro Potenze Alleate, che dopo d'aver come essi dicono, fatto tanti sforzi per annichilire Mehemet Ali, sono ora costrette a consigliare il Sultano di accordare al suo potente vassallo tutte quelle condizioni che piacquegli di imporre a se stesso, e da mezzo delle quali arriverà egli tosto o tardi alla tanto bramata indipendenza. Difatti, aggiungono essi, ha egli 80,000 uomini scelti a sua disposizione; dei buoni generali, ne gli viene rotta l'influenza morale che esercita sulla massa, perchè gli si accorda la facoltà di creare gli ufficiali. Con ciò e questi, ed i soldati ed il popolo restano nella persuasione che il suo potere non è minimamente scemato, e quindi dominando egli sul loro spirito li saprà esaltare a suo piacere, e qualora si presenterà un'occasione favorevole, che non può tardare, invaderà nuovamente il vacillante Impero Ottomano, ed il Sultano impotente sarà costretto di accordargli la bramata indipendenza, o varrà precipitato dal mal fermo suo trono.

Eccole in complesso le dicerie di molti e molti partigiani, che però non riescono a tranquillizzare colle loro ciarle la maggioranza del pubblico, la quale, come già ebbi l'onore di dirli, teme di una non lontana nuova collisione.

Trattanto i lavori alle fortificazioni vengono continuati senza interruzione, e la guardia nazionale esercitata frequentemente nelle manovre.

L'armata dicesi essere stata portata al suo completo, per le assidue cure di Ibrahim Pascià.

Gli equipaggi della flotta saranno soldati fra pochi giorni di tutti i loro avvanzi, ed è stato deciso che d'ora in poi saranno pagati puntualmente ogni mese. Chi conosce quanto si possa contare sulle belle promesse di Boghos Bey, mette in dubbio l'esecuzione di tale decisione.

È stato pure decisa nel Divano la costruzione d'un vascello a tre ponti, due a due ponti, e cinque fregati da 64. Prima però che ciò sia eseguito, bisognerà che il Governo si procuri i legnami da costruzione, poichè per ora non ne ha tanti da costruire otto barche canoniere.

Un bastimento Maltese, giunto recentemente dall'Inghilterra, portò al governo oltre a molti oggetti di guerra, dei mortai e delle bombe, cioè, unitamente alle circostanze precedentemente descritte, non è certamente una pruova di obbedienza e di sommissione di Mehemet Ali verso il suo Sovrano.

(Translation.)

THE Frank population of Alexandria, who looked upon the affairs relating to the Turco-Egyptian Question as definitively settled, became, as it were, astounded upon hearing that the Consuls-General had been ordered to retard their departure for this place.

The apprehensions which had been already allayed for some time, were again awakened. Every one fears new complications, and many fancy that they already behold the British ships on the horizon threatening to bombard Alexandria. Those who a short time before were exulting in the thoughts of a definitive settlement of affairs, and who looked forward to a happy state of things, are now perplexed, and apprehend evil, unless a prompt solution of these new complications should terminate the actual state of uncertainty.

On the other hand, the partizans of the Egyptian Government shout victory. They assure that the Pasha has obtained all the modifications which he demanded, and they even go so far as to laugh at the Four Allied Powers, who, they say, after making so many exertions to annihilate Mehemet Ali, are now obliged to advise the Sultan to grant to his powerful vassal all the conditions which he pleased to make for himself, and by means of which he will, sooner or later, attain the independence he so much covets. They add, in fact, that he has at his disposal 80,000 chosen men, and good generals, and that he still maintains his moral influence over the mass of the people, inasmuch as he has been granted the power to appoint his own officers. Thus both they, the soldiers and the people, continue in the belief that his power is by no means weakened, and with this hold over their minds he will be enabled to inflame them as he pleases; and whenever a favorable opportunity arrives, which cannot be long, he will again invade the tottering Ottoman Empire, and the feeble Sultan will be obliged to grant him the independence he desires, or he will be hurled from his weak throne. I give you here the substance of the reports of many of these partizans, who, however, do not succeed by their idle talk in tranquillizing the majority of the people, who, as I before stated, apprehend a not distant collision.

The works at the fortifications are in the mean time carried on without interruption, and the National Guard is frequently exercised in manœuvring.

The army is said to be now complete, owing to the unceasing exertions of Ibrahim Pasha.

The crews of the fleet will be paid all their arrears in a few days, and it has been decided that they shall be henceforward regularly paid every month. The performance of this is, however, doubted by those who know the degree of reliance which can be put in the fine promises of Boghos Bey.

It has been also decided by the Council to construct a three decker, two two deckers, and five 64-gun frigates. The Government, however, will be obliged first to provide timber for this purpose, for it has not sufficient, at this time, to build eight gun-boats.

A Maltese ship, lately arrived from England, brought some mortars and shells for the Government, besides a quantity of other warlike stores. This, combined with the before related facts, affords anything but a proof of Mehemet Ali's obedience and submission to his Sovereign.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 24.)

(No. 185.)

My Lord,

Therapia, June 2, 1841.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you that the firman and vizirial letter, and instructions to Muhib Effendi, were sent off yesterday in a steamer to Alexandria.

I inclose copies of the letter and of the instructions.

I have received your Lordship's instruction, from 99 to 116 inclusive, by the messenger Townley, whom I propose to despatch on the 5th or 6th instant.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSOMBY.

Inclosure 1 in No. 64.

Letter from the Grand Vizier to Mehmet Ali; communicated by the Porte to the Representatives of the Allied Courts, May 28, 1841.

(Traduction.)

J'AI pris connaissance de la lettre responsive que votre Altesse m'a envoyée en date du 6 Muharem 1257 (28 Février, 1841), renfermant quelques représentations et quelques demandes, et je l'ai mise sous les yeux de Sa Majesté Impériale.

Sa Hautesse agissant d'après les impulsions de son naturel magnanime et les besoins de son cœur plein de bonté pour ses serviteurs, étant animée de nouveaux sentimens favorables pour votre Altesse, et ayant eu égard aux représentations bienveillantes et aux demandes loyales des Hautes Cours amies et alliées, a gracieusement daigné accorder, parmi les demandes qui vous avez faites, ce qui suit:

Pour ce qui regarde la succession, on renonce à l'élection, et la succession sera dévolue, dans la ligne masculine, à l'aîné de vos fils et de vos petits-fils.

Il n'est plus question du quart des revenus, et le tribut à payer annuellement pour la province d'Egypte est fixé à un tant.

Par rapport aux grades militaires, on aura à demander ici l'autorisation de nommer des Généraux de Division et des Généraux de Brigade; mais votre Altesse pourra conférer jusqu'au grade de Colonel.

Quant aux lois de l'Empire, les principes fondamentaux de ces lois consistent dans la sûreté de la propriété et de la vie, et dans la conservation de l'honneur: principes légitimes et naturels qui sont posés dans le Hatti Shériff de Gulhané, qui, comme votre Altesse sait, sont des lois générales, c'est-à-dire les élémens constitutifs de tout gouvernement, de tout pouvoir, dont ils sont, pour ainsi dire, l'âme, et qui ne sont susceptibles dans aucun pays, ni de distinction dans leur application, ni de la moindre modification. Enfin ces principes ne sauraient varier ni à cause de la différence du climat, ni à cause de la diversité des caractères des hommes; et l'on ne peut pas dire, par exemple, qu'ils sont nécessaires dans un pays, et qu'il ne semble pas qu'ils le soient dans un autre. Mais l'esprit de la législation et la raison veulent que ces principes soient appliqués dans tous les pays en général et sans distinction, à tous les rangs de la société, à toutes les classes des sujets, et à toutes les nations. Aussi un firman Impérial a-t-il été formellement lu et publié à ce sujet, il y a quelque temps, en Egypte. La volonté divine et les ordres souverains s'opposent à ce que l'on agisse d'une manière qui soit en la moindre chose en contravention aux principes fondamentaux dont il s'agit, et à ce qu'on les change.

Il y a seulement des lois particulières qui doivent en effet, et la simple raison nous le fait voir journellement, être adaptées aux exigences

locales de chaque pays, et même au caractère de ses habitans. C'est pourquoi Sa Hautesse a bien voulu faire des concessions à leur égard et a ordonné ce qui suit:

A condition que dans aucun temps il ne soit apporté la moindre atteinte aux bases du Hatti Shériff de Gulhané, que tous les traités conclus et à conclure avec les Puissances amies soient mis entièrement à exécution, et que conformément aux traités de commerce, l'ancien système des monopoles soit tout-à-fait aboli, les autres réglemens seront mis à exécution en Egypte, en les conciliant le mieux que l'on pourra avec les exigences locales.

Bien que la perception des taxes se fasse dans ces pays-ci par l'entremise de Delfterdars et de Muhassils, pourtant si ce mode de perception semblait difficile à appliquer à la perception des taxes à prendre en Egypte au nom du Sultan, dans ce cas, et attendu que le principal but de Sa Hautesse est de mettre partout, et à tout égard, tous les sujets de l'Empire à l'abri des injustices et des vexations, on adoptera dans la perception des taxes une bonne méthode qui ne doit pas passer les bornes de la justice et de la discrétion.

Comme on ne peut pas dire convenablement, par rapport aux autres lois et au temps du service militaire, que les règles établies dans un pays ne sauraient convenir en tous points à un autre, et que pour cela un autre code est suivi en Egypte, province faisant partie des états de l'Empire Ottoman, on se conformera aux réglemens de la Sublime Porte; mais, pourtant, on agira d'après les exigences locales et les dispositions des habitans, et suivant les règles de l'équité.

Chaque fois que le poste sera devenu vacant, le Sultan accordera à celui qui sera nommé par la Sublime Porte Gouverneur d'Egypte, la faveur de venir à Constantinople pour faire ses remerciemens, et pour offrir les hommages légitimes de ses respects.

Un firman Impérial conçu dans le sens de la décision prise de concert avec MM. les Représentans des Hautes Cours Alliées, et orné en haut d'un Hatti Shériff, et un autre firman Impérial concernant le quantum du tribut, ont été envoyés avec Kiémal Effendi, Khodjoghian du Divan Impérial, à Son Excellence Hadji Said Muhib Effendi, un des principaux fonctionnaires de la Sublime Porte et Ministre actuel de la Justice, qui se trouve à Alexandrie, afin qu'ils vous soient présentés par son intermédiaire.

Les concessions et les faveurs insignes et sans pareilles accordées à Votre Altesse à présent, en sus de celles dont elle a déjà été l'objet, étant de la plus haute portée, et les Ministres de la Sublime Porte étant intimement persuadés que Votre Altesse saura, d'après la sagacité qui la caractérise, apprécier à leur juste valeur les bienfaits signalés qu'elle vient de recevoir de la part de Sa Majesté Impériale, il y a lieu d'espérer et de s'attendre que, remplissant désormais le devoir de la reconnaissance pour ces insignes faveurs souveraines, Votre Altesse fera tout son possible de prouver dans chaque occasion la fidélité et le dévouement dont elle fait profession; et qu'étant un des principaux Ministres de la Sublime Porte, Votre Altesse mettra tout en œuvre pour rendre de concert avec nous de bons services à notre Padichah légitime et notre bienfaiteur.

A la réception donc des firmans, Votre Altesse les fera lire en public; elle exécutera à la lettre les ordres et les conditions réglementaires qu'ils renferment; elle payera dès que le temps en sera venu, le tribut annuel qui a été fixé, d'après les produits et les revenus de l'Egypte, à 80,000 bourses, et elle consignera en entier au trésor Impérial les arrérages accumulés, ainsi que cela est dit dans le firman qui vous a été envoyé il y a quelque temps. Tels étant aussi les ordres de Sa Hautesse, il faudra vous y conformer.

Il n'y a rien à dire quant aux concessions et aux conditions de la Sublime Porte, et il est, par conséquent, hors de doute que, conseillée par ses propres lumières, Votre Altesse s'empressera de faire tout ce qui est nécessaire, et d'en témoigner toute votre reconnaissance. Cependant si, contre toute attente, Votre Altesse montrait quelque hésitation relativement au montant du tribut, nous sommes convaincus que comme

vous conformerez désormais chacun de vos actes à l'obéissance respectueuse que vous professez, et aux lois de l'équité, Votre Altesse avouera et conviendra que la quantité du tribut payé autrefois n'était en rapport ni avec les ressources de l'Egypte, ni avec les devoirs de la fidélité et du dévouement.

Enfin, si Votre Altesse fait des observations sur le tribut et sur les autres conditions, ce sera là une chose inconvenante, et par ce qu'elle n'est pas digne d'elle, et par ce qu'elle est contraire à la décision des Cours Alliées.

Ma franchise m'a imposé le devoir, et c'est ce qu'exige le parfait accord qui va, s'il plaît à Dieu, et sous les auspices de Sa Hautesse, être établi entre nous, de vous faire les observations ci-dessus, auxquelles il faut faire attention et j'ai jugé à propos de vous les faire par suite de l'amitié sincère et de la bienveillance que j'ai pour vous.

J'espère que, d'après les assurances que vous avez données de vos bonnes intentions, de votre zèle et de votre sollicitude pour la prospérité de la Sublime Porte, et particulièrement pour la conservation de la dignité et du bonheur de Sa Majesté Impériale, Votre Altesse écoutera favorablement les conseils que je lui donne et les observations que je lui fais à cœur ouvert, et qu'elle s'empressera de mettre les firmans à exécution.

Le retour des Consuls des Quatre Cours à Alexandrie a été différé par leurs Gouvernemens jusqu'à ce que votre soumission soit complète, mais aussitôt qu'à la réception du firman vous vous serez empressé de le mettre à exécution, on prendra des mesures pour le retour des Consuls à leur poste.

Inclosure 2 in No. 64.

Vizirial letter to Said Muhib Effendi; communicated by the Porte to the Representatives of the Allied Courts, May 28, 1841.

(Traduction.)

LA lettre détaillée que votre Excellence a écrite en date du 5 Muharem, 1257 (27 Février, 1841), et celle de Son Altesse Méhémet Ali Pacha, ont été prises en considération par les Ministres, qui ont conféré entre eux là-dessus, ainsi qu'avec les Quatre Représentans.

En conséquence de la décision prise, un firman Impérial contenant les conditions réglementaires vous est envoyé avec Kiémal Effendi, un des Khodjoghian du Divan Impérial. Vous verrez par ce firman que Sa Hautesse qui est douée d'un caractère magnanime, voulant faire éclater la bonté de son cœur envers ses serviteurs, et par égard pour des conseils dictés par l'amitié, a fait les concessions suivantes: elle renonce au principe de l'élection, et la succession sera dévolue, dans la ligne masculine, de l'aîné à l'aîné parmi les fils et les petits-fils; le Tribut est fixé à un tant; et l'on pourra aller jusqu'à conférer le grade de Colonel.

Quant aux lois de l'empire, comme les principes fondamentaux de ces lois, savoir, la sûreté de la propriété et de la vie, et la conservation de l'honneur, sont insérés dans le Hatti Shériff de Gulhané, et qu'il n'est pas permis de les changer, ni d'établir des distinctions quant à leur application, il est du devoir de la législation et d'une bonne administration de voir que ces principes soient appliqués partout, complètement, et envers tous les sujets. A condition donc que ces principes fondamentaux soient mis en pratique scrupuleusement en Egypte, aussi les autres lois y seront exécutées après les avoir conciliées, autant que possible, avec les circonstances locales.

S'il est difficile que la perception des dîmes et des taxes qui doivent être prises au nom du Sultan se fasse en Egypte comme elle se fait dans les autres parties de l'empire, au moyen de Muhassils, comme l'objet que l'on a en vue est de préserver les sujets de Sa Hautesse des injustices et des vexations, on adoptera pour la perception des dîmes et des taxes un bon système, un système basé sur la modération et l'équité.

Le temps du service et les lois militaires seront établis suivant les

dispositions des habitans de ces pays là, et avec beaucoup de justice et d'humanité.

Tels sont les ordres de Sa Hautesse.

Ainsi que votre Excellence le sait, les revenus de l'Egypte montent à présent à 700,000 ou 800,000 bourses. Bien que par suite des principes d'équité qui vont être adoptés, et de l'abolition du système nuisible des monopoles, cette somme puisse diminuer un peu, les revenus réels monteront annuellement à 400,000 ou 500,000 bourses. Supposons donc que sur cette somme ou dépense 100,000 bourses pour l'armée, et la flotte, 100,000 bourses pour l'administration intérieure, et 100,000 bourses pour les dépenses particulières, encore restera-t-il un excédant de 100,000 ou de 200,000 bourses.

Et considérons aussi que tandis que jusqu'à présent on entretenait une armée de plus de 100,000 hommes, cette armée va être réduite, et portée seulement à 18,000 hommes, ce qui fait épargner les dépenses de l'entretien de 70 ou 80,000 hommes, dépenses qui montent pour le moins à 90,000 bourses.

La capitation et la dime sur les produits n'appartiennent de droit à personne; c'est la propriété légitime du trésor public des Musulmans. Voilà donc trois sources d'où dérivent des sommes immenses. Ainsi il faudrait payer annuellement à la Sublime Porte, sur les revenus réels de l'Egypte, un tribut pour le moins de 100,000 bourses. Mais afin qu'il ne reste plus lieu à aucune dispute, et que les habitans de ces pays là ne soient pas molestés à cet égard lorsqu'ils sont sous les auspices de Sa Hautesse, qui est animée de sentimens pleins de modération et d'équité, Sa Hautesse a décidé que la province d'Egypte payera à la Sublime Porte un tribut annuel de 80,000 bourses, et elle a fait écrire un firman exprès pour cela.

Il y des Sandjaks, tels par exemple qu'Aidin et Saroukhan, qui n'ont pas la moitié de l'étendue de l'Egypte, et dont le tribut annuel, sans y comprendre les dîmes, la capitation, et la douane, monte à 30,000 ou 40,000 bourses.

Comme le tribut fixé pour une contrée aussi vaste que l'Egypte, à 80,000 bourses par an, est tout à fait dans les bornes de la modération, Méhémet Ali a trop de jugement et de sagacité pour faire des difficultés à cet égard. Cependant si, contre notre attente, il faisait des objections à ce sujet, vous lui ferez les raisonnemens ci-dessus, en ajoutant que ses excuses ne sont pas convenantes, et que ce n'est pas ainsi qu'il doit correspondre aux faveurs souveraines dont il a été l'objet. Vous tacherez de faire dresser et de prendre l'acte y relatif, et de faire prendre l'engagement formel de payer un moment plus tôt les arrérages qu'on sait.

Après avoir fait lire en public le Firman Impérial qui contient les conditions réglementaires, et après que le Pacha aura pris l'engagement de s'empresser d'exécuter soigneusement et mot à mot toutes les dispositions qu'il renferme, vous prendrez des dépêches analogues, et vous êtes autorisé à retourner ici, vu que votre séjour prolongé à Alexandrie n'aurait plus d'objet. Vous aurez soin de rapporter avec vous le Firman Impérial qui contenait les premières conditions et qui est orné d'un Hatti Shériff.

No. 65.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 26.)

(No. 192.)

My Lord,

Therapia, June 8, 1841.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of extracts of reports communicated by the Austrian Consul-General at Alexandria, on the number of troops returned from the Hedjaz and Syria, with remarks on the causes which have led to its being exaggerated.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) **PONSONBY.**

Inclosure in No. 65.

Extract of Reports received from Egypt by the Austrian Embassy in Constantinople.

Constantinople, June 4, 1841.

THE War Office estimates the troops returned from the Hedjaz and from Syria together at 48,718 men, and those who were in Egypt in 1840 at 28,696.

These numbers are exaggerated at least by two-fifths; and from official reports it may be deduced that while the commanding officers had two reasons for overrating their troops, the real forces never were above 42,000 men, viz. 9,000 men returned from the Hedjaz, 18,000 men returned from Syria, and the rest, composed of sedentary troops (militia), invalids, and effective troops in Egypt, distributed between Cairo, the Delta, and Alexandria.

The two reasons for which the commanding officers are interested in making out returns above the real strength of their corps are as follows:—

1. The fear of being ill-used by the Pasha, for not having taken care of their men, and this would have sufficed to make them lose their commissions.

2. Pecuniary interests; because the commanding officers draw pay and allowances for rations according to the false returns which they make.

As soon as the Syrian army had returned by the three roads of the Desert *via* El Arish and Damietta, it was found that matters stood not as they were represented, and it was given out that about 33,000 men had been disbanded, while only a great many were sent into hospital, where violent fevers, typhus, plague, and dysentery, are miserably destroying them.

It is supposed, and not without reason, that the return of the army, according to the organization of the 15th March ultimo, amounting to 87,440 combatants, is altogether hypothetical; and that, in reality, Egypt possesses only the *cadres* of two regiments of Guards, twelve of Infantry, two of Veterans, nine of Cavalry, three of Artillery, besides some irregular Infantry and Artillery, in all 50,000 men, exclusively of the Marine forces, which may be estimated at the outside at 5,400 men.

No. 66.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 26.)

(No. 193.)

My Lord,

Therapia, June 8, 1840.

I SEND you a return (which I have before submitted to your Lordship) in order to call your attention to the statement therein made of the number of troops actually in the service of Mehemet Ali, because although the examination* of the facts made by M. Laurin may prove the exaggeration of that statement, it is nevertheless important that what Mehemet Ali intends and is aiming at effecting, and has thought proper to publish, should be made evident to you; and the statement is known to exhibit it.

I have &c.,

(Signed) PONSONBY.

* See inclosure in No. 66.

Inclosure in No. 66.

State of the Egyptian Army in 1840 and 1841.

Situation de l'Armée avant les hostilités.

36 Régimens d'Infanterie complets	-	-	-	-	118,080
3 „ de Garde	-	-	-	-	9,840
15 „ de Cavalerie	-	-	-	-	11,880
5 „ Artillerie de 12 Bataillons	-	-	-	-	12,000
2 Bataillons de Génie	-	-	-	-	1,600
2 Régimens d'Invalides	-	-	-	-	6,560
Troupes Turques Irrégulières, Cavalerie, Infanterie, Mogrebins	-	-	-	-	31,650
Artillerie Turque	-	-	-	-	9,850
Bédouins du Hedjaz et Syrie	-	-	-	-	8,000
Marine	-	-	-	-	12,000
Total					221,460

Division de l'Armée.

EN EGYPTÉ.

2 Régimens d'Infanterie	-	-	-	-	6,560
1 „ Artillerie	-	-	-	-	2,400
3 „ Cavalerie	-	-	-	-	2,376
2 „ Invalides	-	-	-	-	6,560
Artillerie Turque Irrégulière	-	-	-	-	1,600
Cavalerie et Infanterie Irrégulière	-	-	-	-	8,400
1 Bataillon du Génie	-	-	-	-	800
Total					28,696

AU HEDJAZ.

10 Régimens d'Infanterie	-	-	-	-	32,800
1 Compagnie Chasseurs	-	-	-	-	84
1 „ Vétérans	-	-	-	-	102
3 Batteries d'Artillerie	-	-	-	-	600
Artillerie Turque Irrégulière	-	-	-	-	400
Cavalerie et Infanterie Irrégulière	-	-	-	-	9,650
Bédouins du Hedjaz	-	-	-	-	1,000
Total					44,636

AU SENNAR.

3 Régimens d'Infanterie	-	-	-	-	9,840
Cavalerie Turque Irrégulière	-	-	-	-	800
Total					10,640

EN CANDIE.

1 Régiment d'Infanterie	-	-	-	-	3,280
Artillerie Turque Irrégulière	-	-	-	-	400
Cavalerie et Infanterie Irrégulière	-	-	-	-	350
Total					4,030

EN SYRIE.

23 Régimens d'Infanterie	-	-	-	-	75,440
12 " de Cavalerie	-	-	-	-	9,504
4 " d'Artillerie	-	-	-	-	9,600
Cavalerie et Infanterie Irrégulière	-	-	-	-	21,000
Artillerie Irrégulière	-	-	-	-	4,800
Bédouins de Syrie	-	-	-	-	7,000
Total					127,344

Après l'évacuation de Syrie et du Hedjaz.

RENTRES DU HEDJAZ.

10 Régimens d'Infanterie incomplets	-	-	-	-	150,00
1 Compagnie de Chasseurs	-	-	-	-	46
3 Batteries d'Artillerie	-	-	-	-	320
Total					15,366

DE LA SYRIE.

5 Régimens d'Infanterie	-	-	-	-	16,400
2 Bataillons d'Infanterie	-	-	-	-	1,600
6 Régimens de Cavalerie	-	-	-	-	4,752
2 " d'Artillerie	-	-	-	-	4,800
Cavalerie et Infanterie Irrégulière	-	-	-	-	5,200
Artillerie Turque	-	-	-	-	600
Total					33,352

Troupes qui existent en Egypte après la nouvelle réorganisation du 15 Mars, 1841.

12 Régimens d'Infanterie compris les 2 de Gardes	-	-	-	-	39,360
2 Bataillons de Garde	-	-	-	-	1,600
2 Régimens de Vétérans	-	-	-	-	6,560
" de Cavalerie	-	-	-	-	7,128
" d'Artillerie	-	-	-	-	7,200
Troupes Irrégulières Turques, Cavalerie et Infanterie	-	-	-	-	12,600
Artillerie Turque	-	-	-	-	2,200
Marine	-	-	-	-	10,800
Total					87,448

Le même nombre de Troupes qui étaient au Sennar et en Candie existent encore.

Caire, le 22 Avril, 1841.

No. 67.

Mr. Bulwer to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 27.)

(No. 122.)

My Lord,

Paris, June 25, 1841.

M. GUIZOT has received despatches from Alexandria dated the 6th inst., at which period the firman was not arrived.

The Count Chabot had had an interview, however, (as M. Guizot

informed me) with the Viceroy, and informed him that the French Government considered the conditions which the Sultan now offered reasonable, and that no aid or countenance was to be expected from France, should they be refused.

M. Guizot seemed to say that the only point on which resistance could be expected was the tribute, which the Pasha spoke of as excessive.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) HENRY L. BULWER.

No. 68.

Mr. Bloomfield to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received June 28.)

(No. 18.)

(Extract.)

St. Petersburg, June 19, 1841.

A COPY of the firman forwarded by the Porte to Alexandria has arrived here, and Count Nesselrode seems to think it may, perhaps, be accepted *in toto* by Mehemet Ali, or at all events with some unimportant modifications.

Count Nesselrode has received a report from Baron Brunnow of the condition which the French Government wished to impose on the Four Powers, of annulling the Treaty of July, before they would consent to sign the initialed Convention, and entirely approves of the view taken by Her Majesty's Government of this proposal, as detailed by your Lordship to the members of the Conference.

The Austrian Chargé d'Affaires has communicated to Count Nesselrode a long exposé, dated Vienna, May 26, of the view at present entertained by Prince Metternich of the Eastern Question.

A copy of this paper having been forwarded to London, I need not say more on the subject than that it has been well received by the Russian Government.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) J. A. D. BLOOMFIELD.

No. 69.

Mr. Vice-Consul Chasseaud to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 2.)

(No. 31.)

My Lord,

Her Britannick Majesty's Consulate,

Alexandria, June 16, 1841.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that on the 7th instant, late in the evening, a Russian steam-vessel, the "Sitasch," arrived here from Constantinople, bringing Kiamil Effendi, officer from the Porte, who was the bearer of the expected firman, which Mehemet Ali having accepted, the ceremony of its being read in public took place on the 10th instant in the forenoon, when a salute was fired from the forts and the Egyptian shipping in port on the occasion, announcing the event.

I availed of the return to Constantinople of the Russian steam-vessel, which left this on the 11th in the morning, and had the honour of addressing Viscount Ponsonby, acquainting his Excellency with the occurrence.

I have, &c.,

(Signed) G. CHASSEAUD,
Vice-Consul.

No. 70.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 9.)

(No. 200.)

My Lord,

Therapia, June 16, 1841.

THE French steamer on the 14th brought letters here (one being from a person well known to possess the best information in Alexandria) stating the intention of Mehemet Ali to refuse the new firman. Mehemet Ali had not received the firman when the above letters were written, but had received accounts of its contents. Mehemet Ali may alter his intentions before he sends back an answer to the firman. He may have had reasons for expressing an intention to refuse; it is probable that he will do something to gain time. I am of opinion now, as I have always been, that he never will carry into execution the measures ordered by the Sultan under the advice of the Great Powers.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

No. 71.

Viscount Ponsonby to Viscount Palmerston.—(Received July 8.)

(No. 208.)

My Lord,

Therapia, June 21, 1841.

NO doubt but your Lordship will have heard from Alexandria long before this arrives in London, that Mehemet Ali has accepted the firman; I however think it right to inclose the despatch I received this day from Alexandria, reporting this satisfactory intelligence.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) PONSONBY.

Inclosure in No. 71.

Mr. Vice-Consul Chasseaud to Viscount Ponsonby.

*Her Britannick Majesty's Consulate,
Alexandria, June 10, 1841.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency, that on the 11th instant, late in the evening, the Russian steam-vessel, "Sitasch," arrived here bringing Kiamil Effendi, officer of the Porte, bearer of the firman to Mehemet Ali; and that next morning I was informed from good authority, that Mehemet Ali had declared that he accepted the new conditions therein contained. Accordingly, this forenoon the firman was read in public at the palace, and a salute was fired from the forts and the Egyptian shipping on the occasion, announcing the event.

On the 8th instant, Hadji Ali Pasha appointed for Jeddah arrived here in a sailing vessel.

I have, &c.,
(Signed) G. CHASSEAUD,
Vice-Consul.

No. 72.

*PROTOCOLE d'une Conférence tenue au Foreign Office,
le 10 Juillet, 1841.*

Présens:

*Les Plénipotentiaires
d'Autriche ;
de la Grande Bretagne ;
de Prusse ;
de Russie ; et
de la Turquie.*

LES difficultés dans lesquelles Sa Hautesse le Sultan s'est trouvé placé, et qui l'ont déterminé à réclamer l'appui et l'assistance des Cours d'Autriche, de la Grande Bretagne, de Prusse, et de Russie, venant d'être applanies, et Méhémet Ali ayant fait envers Sa Hautesse le Sultan l'acte de soumission que la Convention du 15 Juillet était destinée à amener, les Représentans des Cours signataires de la dite Convention ont reconnue, qu'indépendamment de l'exécution des mesures temporaires résultant de cette Convention, il importe essentiellement de consacrer, de la manière la plus formelle, le respect dû à l'ancienne règle de l'Empire Ottoman, en vertu de laquelle il a été de tout tems défendu aux bâtimens de guerre des Puissances étrangères d'entrer dans les détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore.

Ce principe étant par sa nature d'une application générale et permanente, les Plénipotentiaires respectifs, munis à cet effet des ordres de leurs Cours, ont été d'avis, que pour manifester l'accord et l'union qui président aux intentions de toutes les Cours dans l'intérêt de l'affermissement de la paix Européenne, il conviendrait de constater le respect dû au principe susmentionné, au moyen d'une transaction à laquelle la France serait appelée à concourir, à l'invitation et d'après le vœu de Sa Hautesse le Sultan.

Cette transaction étant de nature à offrir à l'Europe un gage de l'union des Cinq Puissances, le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique ayant le Département des Affaires Etrangères, d'accord avec les Plénipotentiaires des Quatre autres Puissances, s'est chargée de porter cet objet à la connaissance du Gouvernement Français, en l'invitant à participer à la transaction par laquelle, d'une part, le Sultan déclarerait sa ferme résolution de maintenir à l'avenir le susdit principe; de l'autre, les Cinq Puissances annonceraient leur détermination unanime de respecter ce principe et de s'y conformer.

(Signé) ESTERHAZY. NEUMANN-
PALMERSTON.
BULOW.
BRUNNOW.
CHEKIB.

CONVENTION between Austria, Great Britain, France, Prussia, Russia, and Turkey, respecting the Straights of the Dardanelles and of the Bosphorus, signed at London, July 13, 1841.

Au nom de Dieu Très Miséricordieux.

LEURS Majestés la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, le Roi des Français, le Roi de Prusse, et l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, persuadées que leur union et leur accord offrent à l'Europe le gage le plus certain de la conservation de la paix générale, objet constant de leur sollicitude; et Leurs dites Majestés voulant attester cet accord, en donnant à Sa Hautesse le Sultan une preuve manifeste du respect qu'Elles portent à l'inviolabilité de ses droits Souverains, ainsi que de leur désir sincère de voir se consolider le repos de son Empire; Leurs dites Majestés ont résolu de se rendre à l'invitation de Sa Hautesse le Sultan, afin de constater en commun, par un acte formel, leur détermination unanime de se conformer à l'ancienne règle de l'Empire Ottoman, d'après laquelle le passage des détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore doit toujours être fermé aux bâtimens de guerre étrangers, tant que la Porte se trouve en paix.

Leurs dites Majestés d'une part, et Sa Hautesse le Sultan de l'autre, ayant résolu de conclure entre Elles une Convention à ce sujet, ont nommé à cet effet pour leurs Plénipotentiaires, savoir:

Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, le Très Honorable Henri Jean, Vicomte Palmerston, Baron Temple, Pair d'Irlande, Conseiller de Sa Majesté Britannique en Son Conseil Privé, Chevalier Grand-Croix du Très Honorable Ordre du Bain, Membre du Parlement du Royaume Uni, et Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique ayant le Département des Affaires Etrangères;

Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, le Sieur Paul Prince Esterhazy de Galantha, Comte d'Edelstett, Chevalier de la Toison d'Or, Grand-Croix de l'Ordre Royal de St. Etienne, Chevalier des Ordres de St. André, de St. Alexandre Newsky, et de Ste. Anne de la première classe, Chevalier de l'Ordre de l'Aigle Noir, Grand-Croix de l'Ordre du Bain, et des Ordres des Guelphes de Hanovre, de St. Ferdinand et du Mérite de Sicile, et du Christ du Portugal; Chambellan, Conseiller Intime Actuel de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, et Son Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plénipotentiaire près Sa Majesté Britannique;—et le Sieur Philippe, Baron de Neumann, Commandeur de l'Ordre de Léopold d'Autriche, décoré de la Croix pour le Mérite Civil, Commandeur des Ordres de la Tour et de l'Epée du Portugal, de la Croix du Sud du Brésil, Chevalier Grand-Croix de l'Ordre de St. Stanislas de première classe de Russie, Son Conseiller Aulique, et Plénipotentiaire près Sa Majesté Britannique;

Sa Majesté le Roi des Français, le Sieur François Adolphe, Baron de Bourqueney, Commandeur de l'Ordre Royal de la Légion d'Honneur, Maître des Requêtes en Son Conseil d'Etat, son Chargé d'Affaires et Plénipotentiaire à Londres;

Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse, le Sieur Henri Guillaume, Baron de Bülow, Chevalier de l'Ordre de l'Aigle Rouge de première classe de Prusse, Grand-Croix des Ordres de Léopold d'Autriche, de Ste. Anne de Russie, et des Guelphes de Hanovre, Chevalier de l'Ordre de St. Stanislas de seconde classe, et de St. Wladimir de quatrième classe, de Russie, Commandeur de l'Ordre du Faucon Blanc de Saxe-Weimar, son Chambellan, Conseiller Intime Actuel, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire près Sa Majesté Britannique;

Sa Majesté l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, le Sieur Philippe, Baron de Brunnow, Chevalier de l'Ordre de l'Aigle Blanc, de Ste. Anne de pre-

mière classe, de St. Stanislas, de première classe de St. Wladimir de troisième, Commandeur de l'Ordre de St. Etienne de Hongrie, Chevalier de l'Ordre de l'Aigle Rouge, et de St. Jean de Jérusalem, Son Conseiller Privé, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire près Sa Majesté Britannique;

Et Sa Majesté le Très Majestueux, Très Puissant, et Très Magnifique Sultan Abdul Medjid, Empereur des Ottomans, Chekib Effendi, décoré du Nichan Istihar de première classe, Beylikdgi du Divan Impérial, Conseiller Honoraire du Département des Affaires Etrangères, Son Ambassadeur Extraordinaire près Sa Majesté Britannique;

Lesquels, s'étant réciproquement communiqué leurs Pleins Pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, ont arrêté et signé les Articles suivans:

ARTICLE I.

Sa Hautesse le Sultan, d'une part, déclare qu'il a la ferme résolution de maintenir à l'avenir le principe invariablement établi comme ancienne règle de son Empire, et en vertu duquel il a été de tout tems défendu aux bâtimens de guerre des Puissances étrangères d'entrer dans les détroits des Dardanelles et du Bosphore; et que, tant que la Porte se trouve en paix, Sa Hautesse n'admettra aucun bâtiment de guerre étranger dans les dits détroits.

Et Leurs Majestés la Reine du Royaume Uni de la Grande Bretagne et d'Irlande, l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Hongrie et de Bohême, le Roi des Français, le Roi de Prusse, et l'Empereur de toutes les Russies, de l'autre part, s'engagent à respecter cette détermination du Sultan, et à se conformer au principe ci-dessus énoncé.

ARTICLE II.

Il est entendu, qu'en constatant l'inviolabilité de l'ancienne règle de l'Empire Ottoman mentionnée dans l'Article précédent, le Sultan se réserve, comme par le passé, de délivrer des firmans de passage aux bâtimens légers sous pavillon de guerre, lesquels seront employés comme il est d'usage, au service des Légations des Puissances amies.

ARTICLE III.

Sa Hautesse le Sultan se réserve de porter la présente Convention à la connaissance de toutes les Puissances avec lesquelles la Sublime Porte se trouve en relation d'amitié, en les invitant à y accéder.

ARTICLE IV.

La présente Convention sera ratifiée, et les ratifications en seront échangées à Londres à l'expiration de deux mois, ou plus tôt si faire se peut.

En foi de quoi, les Plénipotentiaires respectifs l'ont signée, et y ont apposé les sceaux de leurs armes.

Fait à Londres, le treize Juillet, l'an de grâce mil huit cent quarante et un.

(Signé)
(L.S.) PALMERSTON.
(L.S.) ESTERHAZY.
(L.S.) NEUMANN.
(L.S.) BOURQUENEY.
(L.S.) BULOW.
(L.S.) BRUNNOW.

(L.S.) CHEKIB.

F. O. 573/6

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.

No.

CORRESPONDENCE

RELATIVE TO THE

AFFAIRS OF THE LEVANT.

PART IV.

Foreign Office, July, 1841.